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Marshall Islands

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Evaluation of the Performance of the Veterinary Services

Report

World Organisation for Animal Health | PVS Pathway

PVS EVALUATION REPORT OF THE VETERINARY SERVICES OF

THE REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS

21 March – 29 March 2025

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List of acronyms, abbreviations and/or special terms

AH	Animal Health
AMR	Antimicrobial Resistance
ASYCUDA	Automated System for Customs Data
ASF	African Swine Fever
BIP	Border Inspection Point
CC	Critical Competency
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HPAI	Highly Pathogenic Avian influenza
IEC	Information, education and communication
km	Kilometre
LAN	Local Area Network
MNRC	Ministry of Natural Resources and Commerce
MoHHS	Ministry of Health and Human Services
NDMO	National Disaster Management Office
PC	Pacific Community (previously the SPC)
PVS	Performance of Veterinary Services (WOAH PVS Tool)
RMI	Republic of the Marshall Islands
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SPC	South Pacific Commission, now the Pacific Community
SPS	Sanitary and Phytosanitary
sq km	Square kilometre
t	Metric tonnes (1000kg)
TADs	Transboundary animal diseases
TTM	Taiwan Technical Mission
U.S.	United States
USD	United States Dollar
VS	Veterinary Services
VSB	Veterinary Statutory Body
WHO	World Health Organization
WOAH	World Organisation for Animal Health (previously the OIE)
WTO	World Trade Organization

Acknowledgements

The conduct of this WOAH PVS Evaluation by Dr John Weaver (Team Leader) and Dr Ian Peebles (Technical Expert) hereinafter called the PVS Evaluation Team, has been formally authorised by the WOAH. The support provided by WOAH to this mission is acknowledged with thanks.

The PVS Evaluation Team wishes to express special thanks to Tony Muller, Minister of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Commerce, and his senior staff Iva Reimers-Roberto, Secretary, and Walter Myazoe, Deputy Secretary, for all the leadership and support they provided to the WOAH PVS mission.

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The team was able to visit a number of ministries, the Taiwan Technical Mission and Laura Farmers Association and to talk extensively with staff and others whose support, time and patience in answering our many questions is gratefully acknowledged.

A list of visits and the people we met is attached as Appendix 4 – thank you to all staff and stakeholders who took the time to meet us, contributing to making our mission a success and the visit to your country so enjoyable.

John Weaver

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PART I: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

I.1 Introduction

Following a request to the World Organisation of Animal Health (WOAH) from the Government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), an Evaluation of the Veterinary Services (VS) based on the WOAH PVS (Performance of Veterinary Services) was conducted from 21 – 29 March 2025 by a team of independent WOAH certified PVS evaluators (PVS Team).

The evaluation began with meetings with the Secretary and divisional staff of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Commerce (MNRC) followed by meetings with the Minister and officers senior MNRC staff. The PVS Team conducted field visits to the Taiwan Technical Mission (TTM) and a number of other pig producers of the Laura Farmers Association and the site of the proposed slaughterhouse. Other meetings and visits included quarantine operations at the airport and seaport, the RMI Love Animals drug store, supermarkets and the Ministry of Health and Human Services (MoHHS), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the National Disaster Management Office (NDMO). The mission concluded with a closing meeting attended by senior MNRC staff from the Divisions of Quarantine, Agriculture, Forestry and Administration and Finance. At the closing meeting the provisional findings of the evaluation were presented.

Additional information on RMI is provided in Appendix 1 including a location and country map, geographical and climate information, human demographic data, livestock demographic data and general economic data.

The PVS Evaluation assessed the authority and capability of the RMI veterinary/animal health services with reference to international standards as developed by WOAH in the Terrestrial Animal Health Code (TAHC)[1].

I.2 Key findings of the evaluation

RMI does not have 'Veterinary Services' (VS) as defined in the TAHC, as there are no 'governmental [or] non-governmental organisations that implement animal health and welfare measures and other standards and recommendations'. There is no mandated Veterinary Authority in RMI. The few private sector veterinarians operating in RMI (two full time for TTM, and periodic visits supported by government and the NGO, RMI Love Animals) are not accredited or approved by a Veterinary Authority or other government agency.

The PVS Team assessed the authority and capability of the veterinary and animal health services available in the country. In this report these are referred to as the Veterinary Services (VS), though they do not comply with the definition, as described above.

Overall, the PVS Evaluation found that RMI VS had some strengths in border control and preventing the incursion of diseases and pests but faced major limitations in resources (staffing and budgets) and the ability to implement effective programmes in animal health, veterinary public health (that is food safety, the control of zoonoses/diseases that spread from animals to humans, and antimicrobial/antibiotic resistance) and animal welfare.

A summary of the PVS Evaluation findings is provided here with additional information provided in the main body of the report.

[1] https://www.woah.org/en/what-we-do/standards/codes-and-manuals/terrestrial-code-online-access/

I.2.A Human, physical and financial resources

There are no government veterinarians in RMI and this severely compromises the ability to design and deliver programmes in animal health, veterinary public health and animal welfare. The TTM veterinarians that are residents in the country only service their pig production farm and provide only limited oversight, with no animal treatments, to pig producers of the Laura Farmers Association. Visiting RMI Love Animals veterinarians visit for short periods (one week – two weeks) three to four times annually. There is no veterinary oversight or development of government policies and memes.

The MNRC 12 paravets have only received basic short-course training in animal health and are not able to provide the veterinary oversight or development of government policies and programmes. Performance reviews are undertaken but there is no ongoing staff training programme. There is no veterinary supervision of the paravets, all of whom are employed by MNRC, except for those seconded to work at TTM. The paravets also support the RMI Love Animals veterinary missions but are employed by and paid by MNRC.

There are no specific VS policies or programmes in RMI. The Agriculture Sector Plan targets economic development, sustainability and food security but makes no reference to animal health, veterinary public health or animal welfare. Technically independent decision making is limited by a lack of data and information on animal health and production.

Coordination of the VS is direct with all staff based in Majuro except for two paravets stationed at Ebeye as quarantine inspectors. Coordination with other government ministries and agencies, referred to as Competent Authorities in the international standards, is variable with strong coordination and collaboration with Customs, but little with MoHHS, EPA and the NDMO. This limited cross-sectoral engagement restricts the ability to develop robust programmes in managing emergency preparedness and response and the development of synergies in addressing cross-cutting issues such as food safety.

Good physical resources are available in Majuro – office accommodation, transport, IT systems and video conferencing with periodic updating and replacement. Operating budgets are very limited with low staff salaries and little funding for field activities. Processes are in place for the release of funds for animal health and veterinary public health emergencies. Government has supported the emergency response to the Coconut Rhinoceros Beetle (CRB) but with much of the funding provided by an international agency.

I.2.B Technical authority and capability

With the exception of border control there is very little capacity of the VS in RMI to deliver any programme in animal health, veterinary public health or animal welfare.

Border control is in place at the main entry points in Majuro and Ebeye with quarantine inspectors monitoring incoming passengers and goods. Limitations are that the scanners are not working at Majuro airport, and the ad hoc checking of luggage is ‘light touch’ with limited opening of luggage and if there are any undeclared materials, passengers are merely required to update their declaration, that is there is no confiscation or enforcement of penalties. Border control requires yachts to report to Majuro or Ebeye but this is difficult to enforce with such a large number of dispersed atolls and islands. Goods received at the post office are not routinely checked.

Other activities requiring the VS to have technical authority and capabilities are largely unavailable. There is no animal health laboratory capacity in RMI, no risk assessment, no surveillance/early detection-reporting programme, and no programme for animal slaughter and food safety. There is no specific VS/animal health programme for emergency preparedness and response to animal diseases or veterinary public health issues, though the government commitment to the emergency control programme for CRB does provide a model for such preparedness and to responses. There is a National Action Plan for antimicrobial resistance

(AMR) but this had little input from MNRC and there has been no progress in its implementation in the animal health sector; though it is noted that the availability of veterinary medicines is very limited in RMI – to the TTM and RMI sponsored veterinarians only. There is no identification or registration of livestock premises or animals; dogs are identified by microchip prior export testing. There is no animal welfare programme, though RMI Love Animals supports the welfare of companion animals (dogs and cats) as part of its programme of sterilisation and vaccination.

I.2.C Interaction with stakeholders

TTM development programme produces pigs on its farm in Laura and also supports the production of pigs by the smallholder pig producers of the Laura Farmers Association. RMI Love Animals supports government in reducing the population of companion animals, particularly dogs, and improves their health and welfare by providing vaccinations and basic clinical services during the visiting veterinary missions. There are no joint programmes, or delegation to the private sector and no other public-private partnerships in place in RMI.

MNRC has a communications budget, but no specific budget to address animal health, veterinary public health or animal welfare issues. Some basic posters on biosecurity were pasted on the airport walls, and a small A4 paper poster produced by USDA was available at MNRC. Consultations across government and with the private sector had been undertaken as part of the development of the Biosecurity Bill.

Staff of MNRC, especially senior staff, regularly attend regional and international meetings, and this is supported by online video conferencing.

There are no veterinary clinical services available in RMI, except when RMI Love Animals veterinary missions are in the country three to four times a year, and as TTM provides to their own animals and in the advice only, no treatment provided, to the associated smallholder pig producers of the Laura Farmers Association. The paravets have received basic training but provide no clinical or treatment services so most times no clinical veterinary service is available in RMI.

I.2.D Access to markets

RMI has extensive legislation covering the broad issues of quarantine, disease detection and response, food safety and disaster responses but with major limitations in coverage and a lack of detailed implementing regulations. The draft Biosecurity Bill, due for enactment in 2026, addresses some of these limitations but many gaps remain. Major gaps include no power of entry to premises/seizure of livestock, equipment etc., no licensing/registration of veterinary medicines or management of their distribution and use, no premises and animal registration and identification, nothing to address animal welfare issues, no registration/accreditation of veterinarians and paravets.

The Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP) has been supporting legislation in the Pacific region including promoting biodiversity and the prevention of pest incursions. SPREP provides model laws or guidelines for countries and has supported RMI's alignment with multilateral environmental agreements such as the Paris Agreement or the Convention on Biological Diversity. There has not yet been any input from SPREP or other international organisations into the development of legislation for animal health, veterinary public health and animal welfare.

Enforcement of legislation is limited with the lack of detailed regulations and with only the quarantine inspectors undertaking any routine enforcement with the checking of declarations of the people and goods arriving and some superficial checking of luggage and containers.

There is no export of livestock or animal products. Companion animals are certified for export in accordance with international regulations and as per importing country requirements.

Zoning and compartmentalisation for the trade in disease-free animals and animal products is not relevant to RMI at this time. Consideration should be given to supporting emergency preparedness and response by endorsing the concepts of segregating sub-populations of animals geographically by atoll or island, that is zoning, or by production system as would work for TTM, that is compartmentalisation.

Table 1: Summary of WOAH PVS evaluation results

PVS summary results of Republic of the Marshall Islands	Result
I. HUMAN, PHYSICAL AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES	
I.1A. Staffing: Veterinarians and other professionals	**1**
I.1B. Staffing: Veterinary paraprofessionals	**1**
I.2A. Competency and education of veterinarians	**NA**
I.2B. Competency and education of veterinary paraprofessionals	**1**
I-3. Continuing education	**2**
I-4. Technical independence	**2**
I-5. Planning, sustainability and management of policies and programmes	**1**
I-6A. Internal coordination (chain of command)	**3**
I-6B. External coordination (including the One Health approach)	**2**
I-7. Physical resources and capital investment	**2**
I-8. Operational funding	**1**
I-9. Emergency funding	**3**
II. TECHNICAL AUTHORITY AND CAPABILITY	
II-1A. Access to veterinary laboratory diagnosis	**1**
II-1B. Suitability of the national laboratory system	**1**
II-1C. Laboratory quality management systems	**NA**
II-2. Risk analysis and epidemiology	**1**
II-3. Quarantine and border security	**4**
II-4A. Passive surveillance, early detection and epidemiological outbreak investigation	**1**
II-4B. Active surveillance and monitoring	**1**
II-5. Emergency preparedness and response	**1**
II-6. Disease prevention, control and eradication	**1**
II-7A. Regulation, inspection (including audits), authorisation and supervision of establishments for production and processing of food of animal origin	**1**
II-7B. Ante- and post-mortem inspection at slaughter facilities and associated premises	**NA**
II-8. Veterinary medicines and biologicals	**1**
II-9. Antimicrobial Resistance and Antimicrobial Use	**1**
II-10. Residue testing, monitoring and management	**1**
II-11. Animal feed safety	**1**
II-12A. Premises, herd, batch and animal identification, tracing and movement control	**1**
II-12B. Identification, traceability and control of products of animal origin	**1**
II-13. Animal welfare	**1**
III. INTERACTION WITH STAKEHOLDERS	
III-1. Communication	**2**
III-2. Consultation with stakeholders	**2**
III-3. Official representation and international collaboration	**2**
III-4. Accreditation/authorisation/delegation	**1**
III-5. Regulation of the profession by the Veterinary Statutory Body (VSB)	**1**
III-6. Participation of producers and other stakeholders in joint programmes	**2**
III-7. Veterinary clinical services	**1**
IV. ACCESS TO MARKETS	
IV-1A. Veterinary Legislation: Legal quality and coverage	**2**
IV-1B. Veterinary Legislation: Implementation and compliance	**2**
IV-2. International harmonisation	**2**
IV-3. International certification	**3**
IV-4. Equivalence and other types of sanitary agreements	**1**
IV-5. Transparency	**1**
IV-6. Zoning	**NA**
IV-7. Compartmentalisation	**NA**

I.3 Key recommendations

RMI does not yet have a functional VS, as defined by WOAH's TAHC. The lack of any government veterinarian in RMI, or of any private veterinarian resident in the country who might be authorised to act on behalf of government, prevents the development of animal health, veterinary public health and animal welfare policies and programmes. A critical recommendation of this PVS Evaluation is to recruit or contract a veterinarian to support the development of policies and programmes in RMI.

Further recommendations are summarised below for priority actions that should be considered with additional information provided in the Critical Competencies (CCs) in the main body of the report.

I.3.A Human, physical and financial resources

Recognising the challenges faced by the RMI VS/animal health services with the threat of disease incursions, natural disasters, zoonoses, unsafe food and AMR, there is an urgent need to strengthen the human, physical and financial resources of the Veterinary Services of the country. The following recommendations should be considered:

- Enhance strategic planning, the development of VS policies and programmes by reviewing risks and prioritising needs of animal health and animal production/food security, veterinary public health and animal welfare. RMI's high biosecurity status must be protected by strengthened quarantine to reduce the risk of disease or pest incursions, supported by increased public awareness of the need to report animal health events, the preparation of disaster response and disaster resilience plans (with NDMO) and the development of emergency response capabilities.
- Establish a VS in RMI, in compliance with WOAH international standards, by recruiting or contracting a veterinarian – who should be resident in the country much of the time. The veterinarian should have experience in risk analysis and working in countries with limited resources, ideally in the Pacific.
- Develop the capabilities of the paravets by following up on the gaps and needs identified in staff Performance Reviews and develop and implement a multi-year staff development plan. PC and international agencies and donors can be approached for supporting capacity development. Some paravets should be trained in meat inspection to support the establishment of the pig slaughterhouse in Laura.
- The VS should work with local governments to progressively develop the capacity to address animal health, veterinary public health and animal welfare risks in the dispersed communities of RMI.
- Coordination with other government agencies, such as MoHHS, EPA, Customs and NDMO, should be developed with formal memoranda of understanding and establishment of cross-sectoral committees and working groups to engage and collaborate on the delivery of improved cross-cutting One Health services such as improved food safety, reduced risk of AMR and zoonoses.
- Following development of a strategic plan for the establishment of a VS in RMI, an assessment must be made of the operating budget required, including the payment of staff salaries, staff support costs (mobile phones, fuel, daily allowances, etc.).

- Capital investment has been limited which restricts the development of capacities and capabilities. The strategic plan for the VS should also develop and cost priorities for investment and this should be used as a platform to advocate for additional resources.
- The ability to respond to animal disease and veterinary public health emergencies is limited by the lack of budget for preparedness and response. The existing RMI disaster response plans should be developed to include animal diseases and supported with a range of animal and veterinary public health emergency scenarios. Protocols with timelines need to be defined for the release of government funds – with NDMO and other partners.

I.3.B Technical authority and capability

RMI faces major limitations in its authority and capabilities to deliver the VS policies and programmes required in the country. The following recommendations should be considered:

- There is no animal health laboratory capacity in the country which leaves the country at risk of delayed detection and response to emerging health threats. It is recommended that basic laboratory services targeting specific high risk issues should be developed and these should include 1) the purchase and use of field test kits, initially rapid antigen test kits only, for diseases such as African swine fever (ASF), highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) and rabies, 2) working with MoHHS and EPA to develop laboratory capacity for all sectors for foodborne pathogens and contaminants, such as coliforms, salmonella and AMR, and 3) working with PC and other regional agencies to develop 'reference laboratory' capacity and partnerships in the region to identify emerging pathogens and the cause of emerging health threats.
- Risk analysis is an important approach for countries and others to better target limited resources. Capabilities in risk analysis should be developed in key staff at MNRC. In the short-term risk analysis may be contracted to external consultants.
- Effective border control is critical to prevent the incursion of diseases or pests into RMI. The quarantine services should be reviewed using risk analysis and then strengthened according to the identified priorities. Enhanced communication and increased rigour of border controls should be prioritised.
- Almost no surveillance of animals has been undertaken in RMI and the lack of baseline information limits effective evidence-based development of policies and programmes. An active surveillance, that is survey, should be undertaken of pigs, poultry, dogs and cats. Such a programme should be advocated to donors for their support.
- Passive surveillance, that is the reporting and investigation of disease outbreaks, is critical for the early detection of emerging health threats. Public awareness campaigns should promote the need to report.
- RMI is free of all major animal diseases but ASF, avian influenza and rabies are all present in the region and in trading partners. Contingency plans should be developed for emergency response to incursions of such diseases in alignment with the NDMO protocols.
- When the pig slaughterhouse is completed in Laura it will be important to develop clear guidelines on hygiene, animal management and meat inspection. SOPs for each stage of the slaughter process should be developed and staff trained.

- To promote the food safety of 'home slaughter', an awareness programme should be provided across the country on improving the management and slaughter of pigs and poultry at home.
- A simple programme for the identification and traceability of imported food products and pork products provided by the pig slaughterhouse should be established, with simple batch numbers and date of processing/packing. In time more complex through-chain identification systems can be established.
- A national awareness programme on improving animal welfare should be delivered with a focus on animal care/animal husbandry, feeding and vaccination/health treatments, sterilisation and population control, and animal slaughter (where appropriate).

I.3.C Interaction with stakeholders

MNRC has provided limited communications to producers and other stakeholders on their priority policies and programmes but more engagement with the private sector would support delivery of their key outcomes. The following recommendations should be considered:

- To reduce the risk of ASF, avian influenza, rabies or other emerging infectious diseases, MNRC need to develop a longer-term communication programme with clear definition of target audiences, priority messages and the changes in behaviour/actions required to reduce the risk of disease entry and to promote early detection and reporting. A communications unit should be established at MNRC.
- Consultation with organisation such as the Laura Farmers Association and RMI Love Animals should be increased to support the identification of key policies and programmes to promote animal production/food security and economic development and to address animal health and community safety issues. Additional representative organisations should be established of other livestock producers (pigs and poultry) and companion animal owners (dogs, cats and pet birds) and also with local governments in other atolls and islands. These focus groups will allow increased consultation and prioritising of local interests.
- Options for developing increased joint programmes between MNRC and TTM should be considered – with an initial focus on strengthening the Laura Farmers Association but then extending to other areas in Majuro and nationally. Further options for developing support for poultry production should be assessed with TTM and other donors.
- Pending the recruitment or contracting a veterinarian explore options with TTM and RMI Love Animals to increase delivery of veterinary clinical services.

I.3.D Access to markets

RMI imports almost all its meat and other animal products and only exports a few companion animals each year. Legislation covers quarantine and border control and to a limited extent the detection and response to health threats. The following recommendations should be considered:

- Existing legislation has many gaps and limitations and though the draft Biosecurity Bill will address several issues many gaps will remain – notwithstanding these gaps the Biosecurity Bill should be passed as soon as possible. The existing legislative

programme should be reviewed with reference to WOAH international standards and a strategy for addressing the gaps developed with revised or new acts or the development of enabling regulations. Major gaps to be addressed include: no power of entry to premises/seizure of livestock, equipment etc.; no licensing/registration of veterinary medicines or management of their distribution and use; no premises and animal registration and identification; nothing to address animal welfare issues; no registration/accreditation of veterinarians and paravets.

- Enforcement of legislation needs to be strengthened through the implementation of awareness programmes to strengthen border control and reporting of animal health events, and improved enforcement of non-compliance at the borders with confiscation and/or imposition of penalties.
- As surveillance systems and the VS are established regular notification to WOAH and regional organisations should be made routine.
- Though zoning and compartmentalisation are not relevant for RMI the concept of high-health subpopulations, such as for the TTM production system, and segregation of atolls and islands can be recommended as an important approach to strengthening emergency response and disease control.

PART II: CONDUCT OF THE EVALUATION

At the request of the Government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands a PVS Evaluation was undertaken between 21-29 March 2025.

The evaluation was carried out with close reference to the WOAH standards contained in Chapters 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4, and in other chapters as relevant, of the WOAH *Terrestrial Animal Health Code* (the Terrestrial Code), using the WOAH *PVS Tool* (7th edition, 2019) to guide the process.

This report identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the Veterinary Services of the Marshall Islands with reference to the WOAH standards. The report also makes some general recommendations for actions to improve performance.

II.1 WOAH PVS Tool: method, objectives, and scope of the evaluation

To assist countries to assess their current level of performance, form a shared vision, establish priorities, and carry out strategic initiatives, WOAH provides the WOAH Tool for the Evaluation of Performance of Veterinary Services (WOAH PVS Tool). The PVS Tool is made up of four fundamental components:

- Human, physical, and financial resources
- Technical authority and capability
- Interaction with stakeholders
- Access to markets

These four fundamental components have 45 Critical Competencies, for each of which five qualitative levels of advancement are described. For each Critical Competency, a list of suggested sources of verification was used by the WOAH PVS Team to assess the level of advancement.

The report follows the structure of the WOAH PVS Tool incorporating the descriptions and levels of advancement for each Critical Competency.

The scope of the WOAH PVS Evaluation includes all aspects of the veterinary domain relevant to the WOAH Terrestrial Animal Health Code and the quality of Veterinary Services.

II.2 Context of the evaluation

II.2.A Availability of data relevant to the evaluation

A list of documents received by the WOAH PVS Team before and during the PVS Evaluation mission is provided in Appendix 5. The documents and pictures listed in Appendix 5 are referenced to the relevant Critical Competencies and provide supporting evidence for the levels of advancement and related findings and recommendations.

Table 2 provides an overview of the availability of the main categories of documents and data needed for the evaluation, considering the requirements set out in the WOAH Terrestrial Code.

Table 2: Summary of data available for evaluation

Main document categories	Data available in the public domain	Data accessible only on site or on request	Data not available
→ **Animal census:**			
○ at 1st administrative level (national)			NA
○ at 2nd administrative level (local government areas)			NA
○ at 3rd administrative level (island)			NA
○ per animal species			NA
○ per production systems			NA
→ **Organisations charts**			
○ Central level of the VS		Y	
→ **Job descriptions in the VS**			
○ Central levels of the VS		Y	
→ **Legislations, regulations, decrees …**			
○ Animal health and public health		Y	
○ Veterinary practice			NA
○ Veterinary statutory body			NA
○ Veterinary medicines and biologicals			NA
○ Official delegation			NA
→ **Veterinary census**			
○ National (public, private, veterinary, para-professional)			NA
→ **Logistics and infrastructure**		Y	
→ **Strategic plan(s)**			NA
→ **Operational plan(s)**			?
→ **Activity reports**			NA
→ **Financial reports**		Y	
→ **Animal health status reports**			NA
→ **Evaluation reports**			NA
→ **Procedures, registers, records, letters …**			NA

II.2.B General organisation of the Veterinary Services

The Ministry of Natural Resources and Commerce (MNRC) has responsibility for veterinary and animal health services but has no designated veterinary service (VS).

MNRC operates as five divisions, with organisational structures as shown in the following figures. The Divisions have defined but overlapping roles with the Division of Quarantine being responsible for border control and early detection and response to disease and pest incursions, the Division of Agriculture focusing on food security and agricultural production, and the Division of Forestry on the conservation and promotion of agroforestry.

Figure 1: MNRC organisational chart



Figure 2: Division of Agriculture organisational chart



Figure 3: Division of Forestry organisational chart



Figure 4: Division of Quarantine organisational chart (blue positions are based in Majuro, green in Ebeye)



To undertake the activities of a VS, MNRC has 12 paravets with two being seconded to the TTM farm, and two on Ebeye, as quarantine inspectors.

II.2.C Animal disease occurrence

RMI does not report on its animal disease situation. There have been no reports of any major disease outbreaks, and no surveys have been undertaken. Prior to export, mostly to the U.S., dogs are tested for rabies with no cases ever being detected.

Reports on zoonoses are also limited. Leptospirosis is common on Pacific Islands and has been reported from RMI, though not recently. Toxocariasis has been found to have a high seroprevalence among primary school children in RMI, indicating widespread exposure.

II.3 Organisation of the evaluation

II.3.A Timetable of the mission

Appendix 2 provides the timetable and a map of the mission and details of the facilities and locations visited by the WOAH PVS Team and Appendix 3 provides the air travel of team members.

II.3.B Categories of sites and sampling for the evaluation

Table 3 lists the categories of sites relevant to the evaluation and the number of each category of sites in the country. It indicates how many of the sites were visited, in comparison with the suggested sampling framework ("ideal" sampling) recommended in WOAH PVS Manual.

Table 3: Site sampling

	Terminology or names used in the country	Number	"Ideal" sampling	Actual sampling
GEOGRAPHICAL ZONES OF THE COUNTRY				
Climatic zone	Island - tropical	1	1	
ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANISATION OF THE COUNTRY				
1st administrative level	National	1	1	
2nd administrative level	Local governments	24	0	5+
3rd administrative level	Islands	1000+	20	3
VETERINARY SERVICES ORGANISATION AND STRUCTURE				
National VS	MNRC	1	1	1
Internal VS	Divisions	5	3	4
FIELD ANIMAL HEALTH NETWORK				
Field level of the VS (animal health)	NA	0		–
Private veterinary sector/NGO		1		1
VETERINARY MEDICINES & BIOLOGICALS				
Import	TTM and NGO	2	2	2
Retail sector	None	0		–
VETERINARY LABORATORIES				
Veterinary laboratories	None	0		–
ANIMAL AND ANIMAL PRODUCTS MOVEMENT CONTROL				
Bordering countries	None			–
Airports and seaports border posts	Border posts	6	3	3
Internal check points	None	0		–
Live animal markets	None	0		–
Zones, compartments	None	0		
PUBLIC HEALTH INSPECTION OF ANIMALS AND ANIMAL PRODUCTS				
Slaughterhouses	None	0		0
Retail outlets (butchers, shops, rest.)	Supermarkets	10	3	4
TRAINING AND RESEARCH ORGANISATIONS				
Universities and training colleges	None	0		–
Veterinary research organisations	None	0		–
STAKEHOLDERS' ORGANISATIONS				
National livestock farmers organisations	None	0		–
Local livestock farmers organisations	Laura Farmers Association	1	1	1

PART III: RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION & GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

This evaluation identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the Veterinary Services, and makes general recommendations, across the four main Fundamental Components of the PVS Tool:

FUNDAMENTAL COMPONENTS	
1.	HUMAN PHYSICAL AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES
2.	TECHNICAL AUTHORITY AND CAPABILITY
3	INTERACTION WITH STAKEHOLDERS
4.	ACCESS TO MARKETS

The activities of the Veterinary Services are recognised by the international community and by WOAH Members as a 'global public good'. Accordingly, it is essential that each country acknowledges the importance of the role and responsibilities of its Veterinary Services and gives them the human and financial resources needed to fulfil their responsibilities.

This WOAH PVS Evaluation examined each Critical Competency under the 4 fundamental components, listed strengths and weaknesses where applicable, and established a current level of advancement for each Critical Competency. Evidence supporting this level included interviews and field observations associated with the mission, and also documentary evidence, as listed in Appendix 5. General recommendations are provided where relevant.

The current level of advancement for each Critical Competency is shown in cells shadowed in grey (15%) in the table and indicated in the line **LEVELS OF ADVANCEMENT - x**. The Level of Advancement obtained by the country during the previous PVS missions is shown in the table preceding Findings in each critical competency.

III.1 Fundamental component I: Human, physical and financial resources

This component of the evaluation concerns the institutional effectiveness and sustainability of the VS as demonstrated by the levels of human, physical and financial resources available and their efficient application. It comprises fourteen Critical Competencies:

Critical Competencies:

Section I-1	**Professional and technical staffing of the Veterinary Services (VS)**
	A. Veterinary and other professionals (university qualified)
	B. Veterinary paraprofessionals
Section I-2	**Competency and education of veterinarians and veterinary paraprofessionals**
	A. Veterinarians
	B. Veterinary paraprofessionals
Section I-3	**Continuing education (CE)**
Section I-4	**Technical independence**
Section I-5	**Planning, sustainability and management of policies and programmes**
Section I-6	**Coordination capability of the Veterinary Services**
	A. Internal coordination (chain of command)
	B. External coordination (including the One Health approach)
Section I-7	**Physical resources and capital investment**
Section I-8	**Operational funding**
Section I-9	**Emergency funding**

Terrestrial Code References:
Points 1-7, 9 and 14 of Article 3.1.2. on Fundamental principles of quality: Professional judgement/Independence/ Impartiality/Integrity/Objectivity/Veterinary legislation/General organisation/Procedures and standards/Human and financial resources.
Point 4 of Article 3.2.1. on General considerations.
Point 1 of Article 3.2.2. on Scope.
Points 1 and 2 of Article 3.2.3. on Evaluation criteria for the organisational structure of the Veterinary Services.
Point 2 of Article 3.2.4. on Evaluation criteria for quality system.
Article 3.2.5. on Evaluation criteria for human resources.
Points 1-3 of Article 3.2.6. on Evaluation criteria for material resources: Financial/Administrative/Technical.
Points 3 and Sub-point d) of Point 4 of Article 3.2.10. on Performance assessment and audit programmes: Compliance/In-Service training and development programme for staff.
Article 3.2.12. on Evaluation of the veterinary statutory body.
Points 1-5 and 10 of Article 3.2.14. on Organisation and structure of Veterinary Services/National information on human resources/Financial management information/Administration details/Laboratories engaged in diagnosis/Performance assessment and audit programmes.

I-1. PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL STAFFING OF THE VETERINARY SERVICES (VS)

DEFINITION
The appropriate level of staffing of the VS to allow for veterinary and technical functions to be undertaken efficiently and effectively.
A. Veterinary and other professionals (university qualified)
The appropriate level of staffing of the VS to allow for veterinary and other professional functions to be undertaken efficiently and effectively.
LEVELS OF ADVANCEMENT - 1
1. The majority of positions requiring veterinary or other professional skills are not occupied by appropriately qualified professionals.
2. The majority of positions requiring veterinary or other professional skills are occupied by appropriately qualified professionals at central and state/provincial levels.
3. The majority of positions requiring veterinary or other professional skills are occupied by appropriately qualified professionals at local (field) levels.
4. There is a systematic approach to defining job descriptions and formal, merit-based appointment and promotion procedures for *veterinarians* and other professionals.
5. There are effective procedures for formal performance assessment and performance management of *veterinarians* and other professionals.

I-1.A.a. Findings:

The government has no veterinarians on its staff.

The TTM has two veterinarians who provide clinical services, husbandry advice and directions on maintaining biosecurity for their production site. These veterinarians provide oversight and management guidance to pig producers of the Laura Farmers Association, but do not provide any treatments. These veterinarians do not provide clinical services to any other party.

The NGO, RMI Love Animals, facilitates missions from overseas veterinarians three to four times annually. The focus of these missions is on dog health and population control by sterilising and vaccinating dogs.

I-1.A.b. Strengths:

- No strengths identified

I-1.A.c. Weaknesses:

- No veterinarians on government staff and no veterinarians in country that can undertake official tasks

I-1.A.d. Recommendations:

- Recruit an official veterinarian to undertake government tasks in compliance with international standards

I-1.A.e. Evidence (as listed in Appendix 5): L1, P5, P6, P7, W1, W2, W4

I-1. PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL STAFFING OF THE VETERINARY SERVICES (VS)

DEFINITION
The appropriate level of staffing of the VS to allow for veterinary and technical functions to be undertaken efficiently and effectively.
B. Veterinary paraprofessionals
The appropriate level of staffing of the VS to allow for *veterinary paraprofessional* (according to the WOAH definition) functions to be undertaken efficiently and effectively. This covers WOAH *veterinary para-professional* categories having trained at dedicated educational institutions with formal qualifications which are recognised by the government or the VSB.
LEVELS OF ADVANCEMENT - 1
1. The majority of positions requiring *veterinary paraprofessional* skills are not occupied by personnel holding appropriate qualifications.
2. Some positions requiring *veterinary paraprofessional* skills are occupied by personnel holding appropriate qualifications. There is little or no veterinary supervision.
3. The majority of positions requiring *veterinary paraprofessional* skills are occupied by personnel holding appropriate qualifications. There is a variable level of veterinary supervision.
4. The majority of *veterinary paraprofessional* positions are effectively supervised on a regular basis by *veterinarians*.
5. There are effective management procedures for formal appointment and promotion, as well as performance assessment and performance management of *veterinary paraprofessionals*.

I-1.B.a. Findings:

As defined by WOAH there are no veterinary paraprofessionals in the country, that is the 'paravets' employed by MNRC have not been trained at a dedicated tertiary institution and have only received short course trainings.

The paravets are currently either working at MNRC at Majuro (n = 8) or Ebeye (n = 2) or seconded to work for TTM where they provide stockmanship and animal husbandry support (n = 2). Five of the paravets at Majuro and two at Ebeye work as quarantine inspectors, the others are extension officers. The paravets also support visiting veterinary teams, as organised by RMI Love Animals.

Job descriptions are available with definition of key responsibilities such as for quarantine officers – inspection of vessels, checking manifests and issuance of permits; and for livestock officers – sow, boar and pig management, artificial insemination and recording.

Annual performance reviews are undertaken for each staff member of MNRC.

I-1.B.b. Strengths:

- 12 paravets are supporting delivery of animal health and quarantine services at TTM and for MNRC in Majuro and Ebeye
- No veterinary products are being administered by the paravets, or anybody at MNRC

I-1.B.c. Weaknesses:

- No veterinary paraprofessionals (as defined by WOAH)
- No veterinary supervision, except by TTM veterinarians of paravets providing support to the pig producers of the Laura Farmers Association

I-1.B.d. Recommendations:

- Recruit veterinarian(s) to provide veterinary supervision of paravets
- Engage with regional initiatives to provide further paravet training

I-1.B.e. Evidence (as listed in Appendix 5): L1, P5, P6, P7, W1, W2, W3, W4

I-2. COMPETENCY AND EDUCATION OF VETERINARIANS AND VETERINARY PARAPROFESSIONALS

DEFINITION
The capability of the VS to effectively carry out their veterinary and technical functions, as indicated by the level and quality of the qualifications of their personnel in veterinary and veterinary paraprofessional positions.
A. Veterinary and other professionals (university qualified)
This references the WOAH recommendations on the Competencies of graduating veterinarians ('Day 1 graduates') to assure National Veterinary Services of quality, and WOAH guidelines on Veterinary Education Core Curriculum.
LEVELS OF ADVANCEMENT – NA
1. The veterinarians' knowledge, skills and practices, are of a variable standard that allow only for elementary clinical and administrative activities of the VS.
2. The veterinarians' knowledge, skills and practices are of a uniform standard sufficient for accurate and appropriate clinical and administrative activities of the VS.
3. The veterinarians' knowledge, skills and practices are sufficient for all professional/technical activities of the VS (e.g. surveillance, treatment and control of animal disease, including conditions of public health significance).
4. The veterinarians' knowledge, skills and practices are sufficient for specialised technical activities (e.g. higher level epidemiological analysis, disease modelling, animal welfare science) as may be needed by the VS, supported by post-graduate level training.
5. The veterinarians' knowledge, skills and practices are subject to regular updating, and are internationally recognised such as through formal evaluation and/or the granting of international equivalence with other recognised veterinary qualifications.

I-2.A.a. Findings:

As per CCI.1A, there are no veterinarians employed by government in RMI and the only veterinarians in the country are the two Taiwan qualified veterinarians at TTM and the visiting veterinarians from the U.S. working with RMI Love Animals.

There is no registration process required for veterinarians to work in RMI. The internationally qualified veterinarians have the knowledge, skills and practices in compliance with WOAH standards.

As there is no veterinarian undertaking clinical and administrative activities of the VS, this CC is considered to be not applicable (NA) and has not been assessed.

I-2.A.b. Strengths:

- No strengths identified

I-2.A.c. Weaknesses:

- No veterinarian undertaking clinical and administrative activities in RMI

I-2.A.d. Recommendations:

- Recruit a veterinarian to undertake the clinical and administrative activities of the VS in RMI

I-2.A.e. Evidence (as listed in Appendix 5):

I-2. COMPETENCY AND EDUCATION OF VETERINARIANS AND VETERINARY PARAPROFESSIONALS

DEFINITION
The capability of the VS to effectively carry out their veterinary and technical functions, as indicated by the level and quality of the qualifications of their personnel in veterinary and *veterinary paraprofessional* positions.
B. Veterinary paraprofessionals
This references the WOAH Competency Guidelines for Veterinary Paraprofessionals and WOAH Curricula Guidelines for *Veterinary Paraprofessionals*.
LEVELS OF ADVANCEMENT - 1
1. Positions requiring *veterinary paraprofessional* skills are generally occupied by those having no formal training or qualifications from dedicated educational institutions.
2. The training and qualifications of those in positions requiring *veterinary paraprofessional* skills is of a variable standard and allows for the development of only basic competencies.
3. The training and qualifications of *veterinary paraprofessionals* is of a fairly uniform standard that allows the development of some specific competencies (e.g. vaccination on farms, *meat* hygiene control, basic *laboratory* tests).
4. The training and qualifications of *veterinary paraprofessionals* is of a uniform standard that allows the development of more advanced competencies (e.g. blood and tissue sample collection on farms, supervised *meat* inspection, more complex *laboratory* testing).
5. The training and qualifications of *veterinary paraprofessionals* is of a uniform standard and is subject to regular evaluation and/or updating.

I-2.B.a. Findings:

As defined by WOAH there are no veterinary paraprofessionals in the country, that is the 'paravets' employed by MNRC have not been trained at a dedicated tertiary institution and have only received short course trainings.

The 12 paravets recently completed an introductory paravet training. The course followed PC's 'Paravet Training Manual' and "Student Workbook'. This course covers topics including animals in society, the animal body, livestock species (ruminants, pigs, horses, poultry and rabbits), treatment of sick animals, veterinary medicines, tools and techniques, public health and exotic diseases.

I-2.B.b. Strengths:

- 12 paravets have competed a short course training

I-2.B.c. Weaknesses:

- No veterinary paraprofessionals
- No foundational animal science or animal health course at the College of the Marshall Islands or the University of the South Pacific in RMI

I-2.B.d. Recommendations:

- Support existing paravets to become veterinary paraprofessionals

- Review course options at the College of the Marshall Islands and the University of the South Pacific in RMI to strengthen training in animal science and health as a precursor to becoming veterinary paraprofessionals

I-2.B.e. Evidence (as listed in Appendix 5): L3, D1, D2, D9, P5, P6, P7

I-3.CONTINUING EDUCATION (CE)

DEFINITION
The capability of the VS to maintain, update and improve the knowledge, attitudes and skills of their personnel, through an ongoing staff training and development programme assessed on a regular basis for relevance and targeted skills development.
LEVELS OF ADVANCEMENT - 2
1. The VS have no access to veterinary or paraprofessional CE.
2. The VS have access to CE (internal and/or external training) on an irregular basis, but it does not take into account needs, or new information or understanding.
3. The VS have access to CE that is reviewed and sometimes updated, but it is implemented only for some categories of veterinary professionals and paraprofessionals.
4. The VS have access to a CE programme that is reviewed annually and updated as necessary and is implemented for all categories of veterinary professionals and paraprofessionals.
5. The VS have up-to-date CE that is implemented or is a requirement for all relevant veterinary professionals and paraprofessionals and is subject to dedicated planning and regular evaluation of effectiveness.

I-3.a. Findings:

The VS have access to occasional short course trainings. Training opportunities are provided by external agencies such as PC and FAO and are not specific to RMI. In December 2024, 12 paravets completed a short course training provided by PC – see CCI.2B.

Discussions are ongoing on the need to develop the meat inspection skills that will be required when the pig slaughterhouse is completed at Laura.

Staff performance reviews take place annually, but there is no strategic plan for staff development.

I-3.b. Strengths:

- Attendance at ad hoc training courses
- Discussions on the need to develop meat inspection skills

I-3.c. Weaknesses:

- No recommendations on training needs follow from the annual performance reviews
- No strategic plan for developing staff skills
- Training is highly dependent on external agencies

I-3.d. Recommendations:

- Develop staff development and individual training plans following the annual performance reviews
- Prioritise training needs based on assessment of RMI priorities

I-3.e. Evidence (as listed in Appendix 5): D1, D9, W3

I-4. TECHNICAL INDEPENDENCE

DEFINITION
The capability of the VS to carry out their duties with autonomy and without undue commercial, financial, hierarchical and political influences that may affect technical decisions in a manner contrary to the provisions of WOAH (and of the WTO SPS Agreement where applicable).
LEVELS OF ADVANCEMENT - 2
1. The technical decisions made by the VS are generally not based on scientific considerations.
2. The technical decisions consider scientific evidence but are routinely modified based on non-scientific considerations.
3. The technical decisions are based on scientific evidence but are subject to review and occasional modification based on non-scientific considerations.
4. The technical decisions are made and generally implemented in accordance with scientific evidence and the country's WOAH obligations (and with the country's WTO SPS Agreement obligations where applicable).
5. The technical decisions are based on a high level of scientific evidence, which is both nationally relevant and internationally respected, and are not unduly changed to meet non-scientific considerations.

I-4.a. Findings:

There are no animal health, veterinary public health or animal welfare programmes, however, MNRC generally makes decisions based on scientific evidence. Limitations on decision making are the lack of data and information and the limited technical capacity. There are no government veterinarians or specialists with skills in risk assessment, epidemiology, economics and socio-cultural values and constraints.

Detection of undeclared goods at the sea and airports only results in revision of the declaration with no confiscation of the goods or imposition of any penalties. The lack of enforcement of compliance with import regulations could result in abuse, but none was made apparent to the PVS Team.

There is limited documentation of decision making, that is on evidence and logic used and consideration of benefits and impacts.

The costs of living in RMI is high and government salaries are low with little or no increase for many years and this increases the risk of technical decisions being compromised by self-interest.

I-4.b. Strengths:

- No evidence was provided of interference in technical decisions

I-4.c. Weaknesses:

- Limited data and information available for making robust evidence-based decisions
- Limited documentation of decision making
- Lack of enforcement of border controls at the sea and airports
- Low staff salaries

I-4.d. Recommendations:

- Develop data and information systems to provide robust evidence for decision making
- Document all decisions

- Review staff salaries against inflation and cost of living pressures

I-4.e. Evidence (as listed in Appendix 5): L5, D7, D10, D11, D13, D16

I-5. PLANNING, SUSTAINABILITY AND MANAGEMENT OF POLICIES AND PROGRAMMES

DEFINITION
The capability of the VS leadership and organisation to develop, document and sustain strategic policies and programmes, and also to report on, review and evolve them, as appropriate over time.
LEVELS OF ADVANCEMENT - 1
1. Policies and programmes are insufficiently developed and documented. Substantial changes to the organisational structure and/or leadership of the VS frequently occur (e.g. annually) resulting in a lack of sustainability of policies and programmes.
2. Some basic policy and programme development and documentation exists, with some reporting on implementation. Sustainability of policies and programmes is negatively impacted by changes in the political leadership or other changes affecting the structure and leadership of the VS.
3. There is well developed and stable policy and programme documentation. Reports on programme implementation are available. Sustainability of policies and programmes is generally maintained during changes in the political leadership and/or changes to the structure and leadership of the VS.
4. Policies or programmes are sustained but also reviewed (using data collection and analysis) and updated appropriately over time through formal national strategic planning cycles to improve effectiveness and address emerging concerns. Planning cycles continue despite changes in the political leadership and/or changes to the structure and leadership of the VS.
5. Effective policies and programmes are sustained over time and the structure and leadership of the VS is strong and stable. Modification to strategic and operational planning is based on a robust evaluation or audit process using evidence, to support the continual improvement of policies and programmes over time.

I-5.a. Findings:

There are no specific VS policies or programmes in RMI, that is no programmes covering specifically animal health, veterinary public health or animal welfare.

MNRC's Agriculture Sector Plan 2021 – 2031 sets out guiding principles for food security, economic development, social and environmental sustainability and the adoption of public-private partnerships. There is no reference to animal health, veterinary public health or animal welfare in the Agriculture Sector Plan.

The Agriculture Sector Plan for significant challenges of rearing livestock sector on atolls is recognised with the focus to be on smaller animals – pigs and poultry. Sustainable small-livestock production systems are to be developed with genetic improvements of animal breeds and improved nutrition. The Division of Agriculture is to collaborate with TTM to seek support for capacity building in the development and promotion of sustainable improved small livestock management practices, including animal pest and disease control, and appropriate housing and waste management strategies. Support is also envisioned from PC and FAO. The value of animal wastes in providing compost for improved soil health is recognised. The delivery of services to achieve this output is to be consistent with the integrated cross-sectoral One Health approach by MNRC working with MoHHS and EPA and supported by the collaboration with the TTM. The Division of Quarantine and TTM are to develop an animal and crop protection programme.

A three-year workplan to support the Agriculture Sector Plan has been developed with listed outputs, activities, key performance indicators and budget. Priority outputs include minimisation of environmental degradation, promotion of sustainable small-livestock production systems, increased consumption of nutritious locally produced foods, improved

capacity of the agriculture and forestry sector stakeholders, early detection and rapid response of pests and diseases, and reduced risk from invasive species from incoming ships and aircraft.

The National Action Plan for AMR (2019 – 2023) reviews the country's AMR situation and sets out objectives for reducing the risk from AMR. The plan states that 'Only human health is actively involved in developing and implementing the National Action Plan for AMR with little engagement from other sectors. The Plan indicates the needs and limitations across all sectors including animal health – see CCII.8 and CCII.9 for additional information on antimicrobial usage and AMR. The National Action Plan for AMR has not been updated.

This CC is assessed as Level 1, as there are currently no documented VS policies or programmes. MNRC has rigorous strategic planning, management and operations in its portfolio, but this does not yet include specific policies and programmes in animal health, veterinary public health and animal welfare

I-5.b. Strengths:

- Strategic plans for agricultural development and the control of AMR
- Three-year workplan for protecting and developing agricultural and food production systems
- The plans reference the need for an integrated cross-sectoral One Health approach

I-5.c. Weaknesses:

- No specific livestock sector, animal health, veterinary public health or animal welfare plans

I-5.d. Recommendations:

- Develop detailed plans for the protection and development of the livestock sector, animal health, veterinary public health and animal welfare
- Undertake annual reviews of progress made and the challenges faced and adjust and update plans

I-5.e. Evidence (as listed in Appendix 5): L5, D7, D9, D11, D12, D13, D14, D15

I-6. COORDINATION CAPABILITY OF THE VETERINARY SERVICES

DEFINITION
A.Internal coordination (chain of command)
The capability of the *Veterinary Authority* to coordinate their mandated activities with a clear chain of command, from the central level (the Chief Veterinary Officer or equivalent), to the field level of the VS, as relevant to the WOAH *Codes* (e.g. *surveillance*, disease control, food safety, emergency preparedness and response).
LEVELS OF ADVANCEMENT – 3
1. There is no formal internal coordination, and the chain of command is not clear.
2. There are internal coordination mechanisms for some activities, but the chain of command is not clear.
3. There are internal coordination mechanisms and a clear and effective chain of command for some activities, such as for export certification, border control and/or emergency response.
4. There are formal, documented internal coordination mechanisms and a clear and effective chain of command for most activities, including *surveillance* (and reporting) and disease control programmes.
5. There are formal and fully documented internal coordination mechanisms and a clear and effective chain of command for all activities, and these are periodically reviewed/audited and updated to re- define roles and optimise efficiency as necessary.

I-6.A.a. Findings:

Almost all staff and functions of the VS of RMI are largely located at the MNRC headquarters in Majuro. Small numbers of staff are located at TTM in Laura District, Majuro and on the island of Ebeye on Kwajalein atoll. Management and coordination is direct as staff numbers are small and most are centrally located.

The organisation of the MNRC leads to some uncertainty of role with the Quarantine Division responsible for both prevention of pest and disease incursions at the border and also the response to incursions, whereas the Agriculture Division liaises with TTM, promotes agricultural production through awareness and engagement activities and is to ensure food safety, and also to facilitate and promote pig production. The role and responsibilities of the divisions in responding to animal health and veterinary public health including food safety emergencies is unclear.

There are no regular staff meetings of divisional staff or MNRC.

Staff have job descriptions which specify their manager and deputy manager who may direct them to undertake other duties.

MNRC is highly centralised from its headquarters in Majuro with only quarantine inspectors based in Ebeye. In other areas any VS activities in animal health, veterinary public health or animal welfare would be provided by the Local Government Authorities, who are under the auspices of the Ministry of Internal Affairs; no activities are currently being undertaken.

I-6.A.b. Strengths:

- MNRC has few staff and most operate from headquarters in Majuro
- Job descriptions available with lines of delegation

I-6.A.c. Weaknesses:

- Quarantine and Agriculture Divisions operations overlap and it is not always clear who is to lead
- No regular staff meetings of divisions or MNRC
- No provision for VS activities in islands other than Majuro and Ebeye

I-6.A.d. Recommendations:

- Clearly define Quarantine and Agriculture Divisions areas of responsibilities and operations especially for responding to animal health and veterinary public health including food safety emergencies
- Hold regular staff meetings of divisions and whole of MNRC
- Engage with Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Local Government Authorities on the needs and opportunities to provide VS activities to the other islands

I-6.A.e. Evidence (as listed in Appendix 5): L1, L2, L3, L5, D5, D7, D10, D11, D16, D17, D18

I-6. COORDINATION CAPABILITY OF THE VETERINARY SERVICES

DEFINITION
B. External coordination (including the One Health approach)
The capability of the *Veterinary Authority* to coordinate its resources and activities at all levels with other government authorities with responsibilities within the veterinary domain, in order to implement all national activities relevant to the WOAH *Codes*, especially those not under the direct line authority of the Chief Veterinary Officer (or equivalent). Relevant authorities include other ministries and *Competent Authorities*, such as government partners in public health (e.g. zoonoses, food safety, drug regulation and anti-microbial resistance), environment (e.g. *wildlife* health), customs and border police (e.g. border security), defence/intelligence (e.g. bio-threats), or municipalities/local councils (e.g. local slaughterhouses, dog control).
LEVELS OF ADVANCEMENT – 2
1. There is no external coordination with other government authorities.
2. There are informal external coordination mechanisms for some activities at national level, but the procedures are not clear and/or external coordination occurs irregularly.
3. There are formal external coordination mechanisms with clearly described procedures or agreements (e.g. Memoranda of Understanding) for some activities and/or sectors at the national level.
4. There are formal external coordination mechanisms with clearly described procedures or agreements at the national level for most activities (such as for One Health), and these are uniformly implemented throughout the country, including at state/provincial level.
5. There are external coordination mechanisms for all activities, from national to field, and these are periodically reviewed and updated to re-clarify roles and optimise efficiency.

I-6.B.a. Findings:

There is only limited and informal external coordination with other Competent Authorities and agencies such as MoHHS, EPA and NDMO.

Though the cross-sectoral integrated One Health approach has been promoted in the JEE and the National Action Plan for AMR there is only very limited progress in engagement between MNRC and other entities. There is no formal mandate of MoU for the One Health approach, and no national coordination committee has been established.

Both JEE and GHSI highlight the limitations of the VS/the animal health sector and the limitations need to be addressed by developing One Health coordinated policies and programmes.

MNRC and Customs work together to share information on risks and the need for inspections and further actions on imported goods.

There is only very limited liaison with the local government authorities with minimal communications and no coordinated programmes for risk management.

I-6.B.b. Strengths:

- MNRC and Customs collaborate on imported goods and the need for inspections
- Informal contacts between MoHHS, EPA and NDMO

I-6.B.c. Weaknesses:

- No mandated formal contacts between MoHHS, EPA and NDMO

- JEE and GHSI highlight cross-sectoral weaknesses in legislation, risk assessment, border controls, zoonoses, food safety, AMR, biosecurity, surveillance, emergency preparedness and response and workforce development
- Limited liaison with local governments

I-6.B.d. Recommendations:

- Develop legislation/formally mandate coordination and collaboration between MoHHS, EPA and NDMO, that is implementation of the One Health approach
- Coordinated and develop programmes with local governments
- Review the recommendations of the JEE, GHSI and PVS reports and prioritise strengthening of critical limitations with development of a cross-sectoral budgeted programme of improvement
- Consider holding a 'National Bridging Workshop' to facilitate the development of a One Health approach in RMI

I-6.B.e. Evidence (as listed in Appendix 5): L3, L5, D7, D8, D9, D10, D11

I-7. PHYSICAL RESOURCES AND CAPITAL INVESTMENT

DEFINITION
The access of the VS to functional and well-maintained physical resources including buildings, transport, information technology (e.g. internet access), cold chain, and other necessary equipment or structures. This includes whether major capital investment is available.
LEVELS OF ADVANCEMENT - 2
1. The VS have no or unsuitable physical resources at almost all levels and maintenance of existing infrastructure is poor or non-existent.
2. The VS have suitable physical resources at national (central) level and at some state/provincial levels, but maintenance, as well as replacement of obsolete items, occurs rarely.
3. The VS have suitable physical resources at national, state/provincial and some local levels but maintenance, as well as replacement of obsolete items, occurs irregularly.
4. The VS have suitable physical resources at all levels and these are regularly maintained. Major capital investments occur occasionally to improve the VS operational infrastructure over time.
5. The VS have suitable physical resources at all levels (national, state/provincial and local levels) and these are regularly maintained and updated as more advanced items become available. Major capital investments occur regularly to improve the VS operational capability and infrastructure.

I-7.a. Findings:

MNRC's headquarters in Majuro is located in a well maintained old building. The offices and meetings rooms are freshly painted, are adequately furnished and have working air conditioners. Computers are reasonably modern and available at each workstation many with double screens. Printers are available and networked through a LAN. Internet is available and quite stable. The main meeting room has video conferencing available. Mobile phones are not provided for government staff below Secretary level and staff use their own phones and pay for their own data/use.

MNRC's Divisions have eight vehicles including cars, pick-up and flat-bed trucks. Most are serviceable and in good condition (two are not currently working). MNRC also has agricultural equipment including sprayers, hand tools and cool boxes.

There is no programme for capital investment. Requests for capital items must be approved on an individual basis.

I-7.b. Strengths:

- Good facilities at MNRC headquarters
- Vehicles are available on Majuro
- Capital investment purchases taking place

I-7.c. Weaknesses:

- No facilities, vehicles or equipment available outside Majuro (limited only in Ebeye)
- No capital investment programme or budget

I-7.d. Recommendations:

- Engage with Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Local Governments to establish basic facilities and equipment on other islands

- Develop multi-year capital investment programme and budget

I-7.e. Evidence (as listed in Appendix 5): D5, D13, P1, P2, P3

I-8. OPERATIONAL FUNDING

DEFINITION
The ability of the VS to access operational resources adequate for their planned and continued activities (e.g. salaries, contracts, fuel, vaccines, diagnostic reagents, personal protective equipment, per diem or allowances for field work).
LEVELS OF ADVANCEMENT - 1
1. Operational funding for the VS is neither stable nor clearly defined and depends on irregular allocation of resources.
2. Operational funding for the VS is clearly defined and regular but inadequate for their required baseline operations (e.g. basic disease *surveillance*, disease control and/or veterinary public health).
3. Operational funding for the VS is clearly defined and regular, and is adequate for their baseline operations, but there is no provision for new or expanded operations.
4. Operational funding for new or expanded operations is on a case-by-case basis, and not always based on *risk analysis* and/or benefit-cost analysis.
5. Operational funding for all aspects of VS activities is generally adequate; all funding, including for new or expanded operations, is provided via a transparent process that allows for technical independence, based on *risk analysis* and/or cost-benefit analysis.

I-8.a. Findings:

VS activities are currently limited to 1) quarantine and border control, 2) support for TTM and pig producers in Laura and 3) for the periodic visits by RMI Love Animals missions. No defined budget for these activities is available.

MNRC has a stable but declining budget of approximately USD 1.2m annually of which some 75% are salaries; supplementary funding is sometimes made available during the financial year (October to September). There is a formal budget process with each division proposing a budget for its operations (due April), consolidation of proposals and then submission by MNRC to cabinet for approval (by September). Budget and expenditure reports are maintained by the Chief of Finance and Administration.

For the financial year 2024/25 the operating budgets for the Division of Quarantine (includes the Division of Agriculture, though these were separated in 2018) and the Division of Forestry are approximately USD 30,900 and USD 57,000 respectively. General support for border control, agriculture and forestry activities is also provided by the Division of Administration and Finance which has an operating budget of approximately USD 116,500 (primarily for communication and fuel expenses) and the Division of Trade and Investment which has approximately USD 95,000 (largely for international travel, mostly by the Minister and the Secretaries). Detailed breakdowns of budget activities were not available.

I-8.b. Strengths:

- Government/MNRC has a well-defined budget process
- Supplementary funding may be made available during the year

I-8.c. Weaknesses:

- No defined budget for VS including animal health, veterinary public health or animal welfare activities
- Low/declining MNRC budget

- Low operating budgets – most of budget is committed to salaries

I-8.d. Recommendations:

- Define VS activities in RMI and develop a VS budget
- Advocate for improved funding of activities and increased salaries

I-8.e. Evidence (as listed in Appendix 5): L4, D5, D6, D13, D16

I-9. EMERGENCY FUNDING

DEFINITION
The capability of the VS to access extraordinary financial resources in order to respond to emergency situations or newly emerging issues, as measured by the ease with which contingency and related funding (i.e. arrangements for compensation of producers in emergency situations) can be made rapidly available when required.
LEVELS OF ADVANCEMENT – 3
1. No emergency funding arrangements exist.
2. Emergency funding arrangements with limited resources have been established, but these are inadequate for likely emergency situations (including newly emerging issues).
3. Emergency funding arrangements with limited resources have been established; additional resources may be approved but approval is through a political process.
4. Emergency funding arrangements with adequate resources have been established; their provision must be agreed through a non-political process on a case-by-case basis.
5. Emergency funding arrangements with adequate resources have been established and their rules of operation documented and agreed with interested parties.

I-9.a. Findings:

There have been no animal health emergencies in RMI. The country has been implementing emergency control measures against the agricultural pest, the CRB.

Under the Disaster Risk Management Act, mechanisms are in place for the declaration of an emergency and the release of funds to respond to the emergency. The incursion of CRB in 2023 was declared an emergency and has resulted in a response from government but with funding provided by the U.S. Forest Service. Government support is allowing an active response but without funding. It is not clear how activities will be funded in second or following year activities.

A formal process for declaring an emergency has been established and this allows the release of funds. A special revenue account, a 'Disaster Assistance Account' is established within the National Treasury and under the control of the Ministry of Finance, in accordance with the Public Financial Management Act (2023).

I-9.b. Strengths:

- Disaster Risk Management Act provides management and governance of emergency responses and provides a mechanism for funding emergency responses
- Response to CRB incursion indicates that government would likely commit to responding to animal health and veterinary public health emergencies but funding might not be available

I-9.c. Weaknesses:

- No reference to animal health or veterinary public health emergencies in the legislation
- MNRC does not yet have disaster response or disaster resilience plans

I-9.d. Recommendations:

- Seek revision or clarification on the inclusion of funding for animal health or veterinary public health emergencies

- Develop MNRC disaster response or disaster resilience plans including for animal health or veterinary public health emergencies

I-9.e. Evidence (as listed in Appendix 5): L4, D13, D16

III.2 Fundamental component II: Technical authority and capability

This component of the evaluation concerns the authority and capability of the VS to develop and apply sanitary measures and science-based procedures supporting those measures. It comprises eighteen Critical Competencies.

For all sections of this chapter, the Critical Competency includes collaboration with relevant authorities, including other ministries and Competent Authorities, national agencies and decentralised institutions that share authority or have mutual interest in relevant areas.

Critical Competencies:

Section II-1	**Veterinary laboratory diagnosis**
	A. Access to veterinary laboratory diagnosis
	B. Suitability of the national laboratory system
	C. Laboratory quality management systems (QMS)
Section II-2	**Risk analysis and epidemiology**
Section II-3	**Quarantine and border security**
Section II-4	**Surveillance and early detection**
	A. Passive surveillance, early detection and epidemiological outbreak investigation
	B. Active surveillance and monitoring
Section II-5	**Emergency preparedness and response**
Section II-6	**Disease prevention, control and eradication**
Section II-7	**Animal production food safety**
	A. Regulation, inspection (including audits), authorisation and supervision of establishments for production and processing of food of animal origin
	B. Ante- and post-mortem inspection at slaughter facilities and associated premises
Section II-8	**Veterinary medicines and biologicals**
Section II-9	**Antimicrobial Resistance (AMR) and Antimicrobial Use (AMU)**
Section II-10	**Residue testing, monitoring and management**
Section II-11	**Animal feed safety**
Section II-12	**Identification, traceability and movement control**
	A. Premises, herd, batch and animal identification, tracing and movement control
	B. Identification, traceability and control of products of animal origin
Section II-13	**Animal welfare**

Terrestrial Code References:
Chapter 1.4. on Animal health surveillance.
Chapter 1.5. on Surveillance for arthropod vectors of animal diseases.
Chapter 2.1. on Import risk analysis.
Chapter 6.11. on Risk analysis for antimicrobial resistance arising from the use of antimicrobial agents in animals
Points 6, 7 and 9 of Article 3.1.2. on Fundamental principles of quality: Veterinary legislation/General Organisation/Procedures and standards.
Point 1 of Article 3.2.4. on Evaluation criteria for quality systems.
Point 3 of Article 3.2.6. on Evaluation criteria for material resources: Technical.
Points 1 and 2 of Article 3.2.7. on Legislation and functional capabilities: Animal health, animal welfare and veterinary public health/Export/import inspection.
Points 1-3 of Article 3.2.8. on Animal health controls: Animal health status/Animal health control/National animal disease reporting systems.
Points 1-5 of Article 3.2.9. on Veterinary public health controls: Food hygiene/Zoonoses/Chemical residue testing programmes/Veterinary medicines/Integration between animal health controls and veterinary public health.
Sub-point f) of Point 4 of Article 3.2.10. on Veterinary Services administration: Formal linkages with sources of independent scientific expertise.
Points 2, 5, 7 and 8 of Article 3.2.14. on National information on human resources/Laboratories engaged in diagnosis/Veterinary legislation, regulations and functional capabilities/Animal health, animal welfare and veterinary public health controls.

Article 3.4.12. on Human food production chain.
Chapter 4.1. on General principles on identification and traceability of live animals.
Chapter 4.2. on Design and implementation of identification systems to achieve animal traceability.
Chapter 4.12. on Disposal of dead animals.
Chapter 6.3. on Control of biological hazards of animal health and public health importance through ante- and post-mortem meat inspection.
Chapter 6.4. on Control of hazards of animal health and public health importance in animal feed.
Chapters 6.7. to 6.11. on Antimicrobial resistance.
Chapter 7.1. on Introduction to the recommendations for animal welfare.
Chapter 7.2. on Transport of animals by sea.
Chapter 7.3. on Transport of animals by land.
Chapter 7.4. on Transport of animals by air.
Chapter 7.5. on Slaughter of animals.
Chapter 7.6. on Killing of animals for disease control purposes.
References to Codex Alimentarius Commission standards:
Code of Hygienic practice for meat (CAC/RCP 58-2005).
Code of Hygienic practice for milk and milk products (CAC/RCP/ 57-2004).
General Principles of Food Hygiene (CAC/RCP 1-1969; amended 1999. Revisions 1997 and 2003).
Guidelines for Risk Analysis of Foodborne Antimicrobial Resistance (CAC/GL 77-2011).
Code of Practice to Minimize and Contain Antimicrobial Resistance (CAC/RCP 61-2005).

II-1. VETERINARY LABORATORY DIAGNOSIS

DEFINITION
The authority and capability of the VS to effectively and efficiently use accurate *laboratory* diagnosis to support their animal health and veterinary public activities.
A. Access to veterinary laboratory diagnosis
The authority and capability of the VS to access *laboratory* diagnosis in order to identify and report pathogenic and other hazardous agents that can adversely affect *animals* and animal products, including those relevant to public health.
LEVELS OF ADVANCEMENT - 1
1. Disease diagnosis is almost always conducted by clinical means only, with no access to or little use of a *laboratory* to obtain a correct diagnosis.
2. For major animal diseases and zoonoses of national importance, and for the food safety of animal products, the VS have access to and use a l*aboratory* to obtain a correct diagnosis.
3. For animal *diseases* and z*oonoses* present in the country, and for animal *feed* safety and veterinary AMR surveillance, the VS have access to and use a laboratory to obtain a correct diagnosis.
4. For animal *diseases* of zoonotic or economic importance not present in the country, but that exist in the region and/or that could enter the country, the VS have access to and use a *laboratory* to obtain a correct diagnosis.
5. In the case of new and *emerging diseases* in the region or worldwide, the VS have access to and use a network of national or international reference l*aboratories* (e.g. an WOAH or FAO Reference *Laboratory*) to obtain a correct diagnosis.

II-1.A.a. Findings:

There is no animal health laboratory in RMI.

During the mission, 'point-of-care' antigen detection test kits for African swine fever (*Ingenasa*) were available at MNRC and had been stored appropriately but were beyond their expiry date.

Limited livestock numbers (poultry and pigs) mean that it is unlikely to be financially feasible or appropriate for RMI to establish and maintain a comprehensive veterinary diagnostic laboratory for microbiology, histology, serology or molecular diagnostics (e.g. PCR).

RMI has a need to process and store sera from companion animals for despatch and export testing at appropriate overseas laboratories (typically in the U.S.) and follows IATA requirements. Active surveillance of livestock (pigs, poultry) would also require capacity to process, store and despatch sera.

Ministry of Health and Human Services has a laboratory that includes haematology, biochemistry, and microbiology plus molecular diagnostic capacity for specific diseases. The Environmental Protection Authority maintains a small laboratory primarily for basic water quality monitoring.

The TTM project has very limited capabilities to undertake basic microscopy for parasites and simple bacteriology using gram stains. This capability is only used for their own livestock. TTM do not send samples overseas for testing.

The limited clinical services provided by visiting veterinarians from Hawaii are focused on sterilisation and vaccination campaigns. Any disease assessment is based on clinical signs only.

II-1.A.b. Strengths:

- Regular engagement with the PC who can support the development of field diagnostic capacity for specific diseases (e.g. ASF)
- RMI has strong affiliations with the U.S. and specimen transport to veterinary laboratories in the U.S. is undertaken
- MoHHS and EPA laboratories provide an opportunity for collaboration and training
- One paravet completed laboratory training in Japan for food safety – skills which may be transferable for veterinary diagnostics

II-1.A.c. Weaknesses:

- No veterinarian or paravets with laboratory diagnostic training

II-1.A.d. Recommendations:

- Provide and use rapid antigen test kits for ASF, HPAI and rabies
- Give priority to establishing basic laboratory diagnostic capacity for parasitology (both internal and external parasites) to allow
    - monitoring of domestic livestock and
    - screening of imported companion animals
- Explore collaboration and professional development opportunities for laboratory expertise with One Health partner agencies (MoHHS and EPA)

II-1.A.e. Evidence (as listed in Appendix 5): D4

II-1. VETERINARY LABORATORY DIAGNOSIS

DEFINITION
The authority and capability of the VS to effectively and efficiently use accurate *laboratory* diagnosis to support their animal health and veterinary public activities.
B. Suitability of the national laboratory system
The sustainability, effectiveness, safety and efficiency of the national (public and private) *laboratory* system (or network), including infrastructure, equipment, maintenance, consumables, personnel and sample throughput, to service the needs of the VS.
LEVELS OF ADVANCEMENT - 1
1. The national *laboratory* system does not meet the needs of the VS.
2. The national *laboratory* system partially meets the needs of the VS, but it is not sustainable, as the management and maintenance of resources and infrastructure is ineffective and/or inefficient. *Laboratory* biosafety and *biosecurity* measures do not exist or are very limited.
3. The national *laboratory* system generally meets the needs of the VS. Resources and organisation are managed effectively and efficiently, but funding is insufficient for a sustainable system, and limits throughput. Some *laboratory* biosafety and *biosecurity* measures are in place.
4. The national *laboratory* system generally meets the needs of the VS, including for *laboratory* biosafety and *biosecurity*. There is sufficient sample throughput across the range of *laboratory* testing requirements. Occasionally, it is limited by delayed investment in certain aspects (e.g. personnel, maintenance or consumables).
5. The national *laboratory* system meets all the needs of the VS, has appropriate levels of *laboratory* biosafety and *biosecurity*, and is efficient and sustainable with a good throughput of samples. The *laboratory* system is regularly reviewed, audited and updated as necessary.

II-1.B.a. Findings:

There is no animal health laboratory in RMI. Ministry of Health and Human Services (MoHHS) have a laboratory that includes haematology, biochemistry, and microbiology plus molecular diagnostic capacity for specific diseases. The Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) maintains a small laboratory primarily for water quality monitoring.

The possibility of collaborative arrangements for basic veterinary laboratory diagnostic procedures (e.g. parasitology) has not yet been considered by MNRC.

II-1.B.b. Strengths:

- MoHHS and EPA laboratories provide an opportunity for collaboration and training

II-1.B.c. Weaknesses:

- No veterinarian or paravets with laboratory diagnostic training

II-1.B.d. Recommendations:

- Explore options for collaborating on developing laboratory capacity with One Health partner agencies (MoHHS and EPA)
- If collaborative arrangements are not considered possible, identify locations in existing office space to establish a small basic laboratory

II-1.B.e. Evidence (as listed in Appendix 5):

II-1. VETERINARY LABORATORY DIAGNOSIS

DEFINITION
The authority and capability of the VS to effectively and efficiently use accurate *laboratory* diagnosis to support their animal health and veterinary public activities.
C. Laboratory quality management systems (QMS)
The quality and reliability of veterinary laboratory testing servicing the public sector VS as assessed by the use of formal QMS e.g. having a dedicated quality manager and a quality manual. This includes, but is not limited to, attainment of ISO 17025 accreditation and participation in proficiency testing programmes.
LEVELS OF ADVANCEMENT- NA
1. No *laboratories* servicing the public sector VS are using formal QMS.
2. One or more *laboratories* servicing the public sector VS, including the major national animal health reference *laboratory*, are using formal QMS.
3. Most major *laboratories* servicing the public sector VS are using formal QMS. There is occasional use of multi-laboratory proficiency testing programmes.
4. Most of the *laboratories* servicing the public sector VS are using formal QMS, with regular use of multi-laboratory proficiency testing programmes.
5. All the *laboratories* servicing the public sector VS are using formal QMS which are regularly assessed via national, regional or international proficiency testing programmes.

II-1.C.a. Findings:

Presently RMI has no veterinary diagnostic laboratory capacity. This component is therefore considered to be not applicable.

Note also that the laboratories of MoHHS and EPA have some standard operating protocols but do not have formal quality management systems.

II-1.C.b. Strengths:

- NA

II-1.C.c. Weaknesses:

- NA

II-1.C.d. Recommendations:

- NA

II-1.C.e. Evidence (as listed in Appendix 5):

II-2. RISK ANALYSIS AND EPIDEMIOLOGY

DEFINITION
The authority and capability of the VS to base its *risk management* and *risk communication* measures on *risk assessment*, incorporating sound epidemiological principles.
LEVELS OF ADVANCEMENT - 1
1. *Risk management* and *risk communication* measures are not usually supported by risk assessment.
2. The VS compile and maintain data but do not have the capability to carry out *risk analysis*. Some *risk management* and *risk communication* measures are based on *risk assessment* and some epidemiological principles.
3. The VS compile and maintain data and have the policy and capability to carry out *risk analysis,* incorporating epidemiological principles. The majority of *risk management* and *risk communication* measures are based on *risk assessment*.
4. The VS conduct *risk analysis* in compliance with relevant WOAH standards and sound epidemiological principles, and base their *risk management* and *risk communication* measures on the outcomes of *risk assessment*. There is a legislative basis that supports the use of *risk analysis*.
5. The VS are consistent and transparent in basing animal health and *sanitary measures* on *risk assessment* and best practice epidemiology, and in communicating and/or publishing their scientific procedures and outcomes internationally.

II-2.a. Findings:

MNRC is familiar with the concept of animal disease risk assessment (as outlined during a PHOVAPS meeting held in November 2023) but has no staff who are trained in disease risk assessment. Risk management and risk communication measures are generally conducted based on advice from regional partners, such as the PC.

MNRC has no staff with training or expertise in epidemiology.

MoHHS has epidemiology expertise.

Ship and aircraft waste in not permitted to be off-loaded in RMI. Majuro has a large open rubbish dump which though fenced is accessed by dogs and rats. Hospital waste and sometimes animal carcases are incinerated in a poorly constructed incinerator.

II-2.b. Strengths:

- Strong linkages with PC and USDA may offer opportunities for training in risk analysis and epidemiology
- No offloading of ship or aircraft waste in RMI

II-2.c. Weaknesses:

- No veterinarian or paravets with training in risk analysis or epidemiology
- Poor management of the rubbish dump

II-2.d. Recommendations:

- Reduce animal access to rubbish dump
- Give priority to explore options:
    - recruiting and/or having regular access to a veterinarian or veterinary paraprofessional with expertise in risk analysis and epidemiology

- training a recruited veterinary paraprofessional in risk analysis and epidemiology

II-2.e. Evidence (as listed in Appendix 5): D8, D9, D10, D13, D14, D15, P5, P6, P9, P13, P14, P16

II-3. QUARANTINE AND BORDER SECURITY

DEFINITION
The authority and capability of the VS to operate to prevent the entry of *diseases* and other *hazards* of *animals* and *animal* and veterinary products into their country.
LEVELS OF ADVANCEMENT - 4
1. The VS cannot apply any type of quarantine or border security procedures for the entry of *animals*, animal products and veterinary products with their neighbouring countries or trading partners.
2. The VS can establish and apply minimal quarantine and border security procedures, or the VS only apply quarantine and border security procedures effectively at some official entry points via *border posts*.
3. The VS can establish and apply quarantine and border security procedures based on import protocols and international standards at all official entry points via *border posts*, but the procedures do not systematically address illegal activities relating to the import of *animals*, animal products and veterinary products.
4. The VS can establish and apply effective quarantine and border security procedures which systematically address legal pathways and illegal activities (e.g. through effective partnerships with national customs and border police).
5. The VS can establish, apply and audit quarantine and border security procedures which systematically address all risks identified, including through collaboration with their neighbouring countries and trading partners.

II-3.a. Findings:

Border security is being implemented at four official points of entry – the airports and seaports at Majuro and Ebeye. There is no border control at the post offices, though staff there are expected to notify if they identify any concerns. Border control liaises with the Customs and Immigration services and reviews risk pathways.

A Memorandum of Understanding is in place between RMI and the U.S. military base on Kwajalein atoll that permits the military to conduct biosecurity risk management for the entry of live animals and animal products into the military base; this agreement is consistent with RMI's biosecurity requirements.

Meat products, vegetables and fruits are the main agricultural imports, with the majority of products coming from the U.S. Border security measures cover personal effects of airline passengers and persons entering by yacht as well as containerised commercial cargo entering by ship.

There is almost no import of livestock, other than a few companion animals and occasional (not recent) import of pigs by TTM, and no import of hatching eggs. TTM and RMI only import direct consignments of veterinary medicines for their own use – there is no other import of veterinary medicines to RMI.

Airline passengers are required to declare any food items. The airport scanners at Majuro are not working. Quarantine inspectors check the declaration and will inspect some luggage; if undeclared items are detected the passenger is required to update their declaration and no further action is taken.

Local supermarkets import the majority of meat products and refrigerated (reefer) containers are transported from the main wharf to the supermarket, where they are opened and inspected before unpacking.

TTM infrequently imports pigs from Taiwan and is proposing to import semen. Approval is first obtained from MNRC.

II-3.b. Strengths:

- The Animal and Plant Inspection Act (and subsidiary regulations) provide quarantine legislation to effectively manage the import of animals and animal products
- Import of pigs and pig semen from Taiwan must first be approved by MNRC

II-3.c. Weaknesses:

- Quarantine scanners are not working
- No confiscation of undeclared items

II-3.d. Recommendations:

- Repair scanners
- Implement a risk-assessment based policy of confiscating undeclared items
- Implement an awareness campaign to address illegal imports
- Liaise with development partner agencies (e.g. PC/FAO) to provide risk assessment training to identify and prioritise pathways for possible disease and pest entry

II-3.e. Evidence (as listed in Appendix 5): L1, L2, L5, D3, D7, D17, D18, P9, P13, P14

II-4. SURVEILLANCE AND EARLY DETECTION

DEFINITION
The authority and capability of the VS to determine, verify and report on the sanitary status of their animal populations, including *wildlife*, in a timely manner.
A. Passive surveillance, early detection and epidemiological outbreak investigation
A *surveillance* system based on a field animal health network capable of reliably detecting (by clinical or post mortem signs), diagnosing, reporting and investigating legally *notifiable diseases* (and relevant *emerging diseases*) in a timely manner.
LEVELS OF ADVANCEMENT- 1
1. The VS have very limited passive *surveillance* capacity, with no formal disease list, little training/ awareness and/or inadequate national coverage. Disease *outbreaks* are not reported or reporting is delayed.
2. The VS have basic passive *surveillance* authority and capacity. There is a formal disease list with some training/awareness and some national coverage. The speed of detection and level of investigation is variable. Disease *outbreak* reports are available for some species and diseases.
3. The VS have some passive *surveillance* capacity with some sample collection and *laboratory* testing. There is a list of *notifiable diseases* with trained field staff covering most areas. The speed of reporting and investigation is timely in most production systems. Disease *outbreak* investigation reports are available for most species and *diseases.*
4. The VS have effective passive *surveillance* with routine *laboratory* confirmation and epidemiological disease investigation (including tracing and pathogen characterisation) in most animal sectors, and covering producers, markets and slaughterhouses. There are high levels of awareness and compliance with the need for prompt reporting from all animal owners/handlers and the field VS.
5. The VS have comprehensive passive *surveillance* nationwide providing high confidence in the *notifiable disease* status in real time. The VS routinely report *surveillance* information to producers, industry and other stakeholders. Full epidemiological disease investigations are undertaken in all relevant cases with tracing and active follow up of at-risk establishments.

II-4.A.a. Findings:

There is no effective surveillance programme in RMI – either passive or active. Nor is there any extension programme to increase animal disease awareness for producers and communities to facilitate reporting.

The smallholder producers met during the mission had not heard of ASF and the potential threat it poses.

Though 12 paravets have completed the PC paravet training course, they lack confidence in their knowledge of diseases of livestock or companion animals.

Except when the RMI Love Animals veterinary missions are in country there is no capacity to investigate or collect samples as part of a surveillance programme.

The TTM veterinarians do undertake autopsies of pigs that die but no findings are reported to MNRC.

The Biosecurity Bill, due for enactment in 2026, will permit the Minister to declare notifiable pests and diseases, which must then be published in the Gazette, and will require a ‘person who knows of or suspects the occurrence of a notifiable pest or disease in the Marshall Islands [to] as soon as reasonably practicable notify the Director’; a person failing to comply will commit an offense.

II-4.A.b. Strengths:

- 12 paravets have completed the PC short course training and have basic understanding of anatomy and pathology and can collect blood samples
- TTM undertake autopsies of pigs that die on their enterprise
- Draft Biosecurity Bill will require listing and reporting of notifiable diseases

II-4.A.c. Weaknesses:

- No risk assessment or prioritisation programme of zoonotic diseases, endemic diseases or high-risk diseases in the region/with trading partners
- No government qualified veterinarian or veterinary paraprofessional with experience and knowledge of transboundary animal diseases
- No capacity for outbreak investigations or sampling of animals

II-4.A.d. Recommendations:

- Enact the Biosecurity Bill as soon as possible, and list notifiable diseases in accordance with WOAH's TAHC
- Undertake a risk assessment of zoonotic, endemic and potential disease incursions and develop a surveillance programme using passive and active surveillance – with application of a coordinated cross-sectoral One Health approach
- Ensure paravets engage in online animal disease forums (WOAH, FAO, PC) to improve animal disease knowledge and awareness
- Develop outbreak investigation and animal sampling skills
- Implement an awareness programme of the risks of major diseases such as ASF, HPAI and rabies

II-4.A.e. Evidence (as listed in Appendix 5): L1, L2, L5, D9, D10, D17, D18, P13, P14, W3

II-4. SURVEILLANCE AND EARLY DETECTION

DEFINITION
The authority and capability of the VS to determine, verify and report on the sanitary status of their animal populations, including *wildlife*, in a timely manner.
B. Active surveillance and monitoring
Surveillance targeting a specific *disease, infection* or *hazard* to determine its prevalence, measure progress in disease control or support the demonstration of disease freedom (with passive *surveillance*), most often in the form of pre-planned surveys with structured sampling and *laboratory* testing.
LEVELS OF ADVANCEMENT - 1
1. The VS have no active *surveillance* programme.
2. The VS conduct active *surveillance* for one or a few *diseases, infections* or *hazard*s (of economic or zoonotic importance), but the *surveillance* is not representative of the population and the *surveillance* methodology is not revised regularly. The results are reported with limited analysis.
3. The VS conduct active *surveillance* using scientific principles and WOAH standards for some *diseases, infections* or *hazard*s, but it is not representative of the susceptible populations and/or is not updated regularly. The results are analysed and reported to stakeholders.
4. The VS conduct active *surveillance* in compliance with scientific principles and WOAH standards for some *diseases, infections* or *hazard*s which is representative of all susceptible populations and is updated regularly. Results are routinely analysed, reported and used to guide further *surveillance* activities, disease control priorities, etc.
5. The VS conduct ongoing active *surveillance* for most significant *diseases, infections and hazards* and apply it to all susceptible populations. The results are routinely analysed and used to guide disease control and other activities. The active *surveillance* programmes are regularly reviewed and updated to ensure they meet country needs and WOAH reporting obligations.

II-4.B.a. Findings:

There is no effective surveillance programme in RMI – either passive or active.

The livestock sector in RMI is limited to one commercial pig farm and backyard pigs and poultry; dogs are the commonest companion animals.

The TTM veterinarians, accompanied by paravets, conduct monthly visits to pig producers to identify and advise on health and production issues but do not collect samples for any further analysis or investigation of health issues.

The NGO, RMI Love Animals, supports companion animal welfare and dog and cat population management with volunteer veterinarians and veterinary nurses visiting from the U.S. three to four times annually. Their aim is to promote community safety by reducing the numbers of stray and unwanted dogs, and to promote better animal welfare through population management, vaccination and deworming. The visiting veterinary missions also provide an opportunity for clinical examination and specimen collection, though this is only undertaken for pre-export animal testing.

II-4.B.b. Strengths:

- TTM and RMI Love Animals provide a limited presence of veterinarians in the country
- Good linkages with PC and FAO could facilitate disease surveillance planning

II-4.B.c. Weaknesses:

- Lack of government veterinarian or experienced veterinary paraprofessional to develop an active disease surveillance programme
- No risk assessment and prioritisation of diseases/infectious agents for active surveillance
- No budget to undertake active surveillance/disease surveys

II-4.B.d. Recommendations:

- Undertake a risk assessment of zoonotic, endemic and potential disease incursions and develop a surveillance programme using passive and active surveillance
- Recruit experienced veterinarian or veterinary paraprofessionals to develop an appropriate active disease surveillance programme
- Approach regional partners to support active surveillance (a survey) in RMI of prevalent and high-risk diseases present in the region/with trading partners

II-4.B.e. Evidence (as listed in Appendix 5): D10

II-5. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE

DEFINITION
The authority and capability of the VS to be prepared and respond rapidly to a sanitary emergency threat (such as a significant disease *outbreak* or food safety emergency).
LEVELS OF ADVANCEMENT - 1
1. The VS have no field network or established procedure to determine whether a sanitary emergency threat exists or the authority to declare such an emergency and respond appropriately.
2. The VS have a field network and an established procedure to determine whether a sanitary emergency threat exists, but lacks the legal and financial support to respond effectively. The VS may have basic emergency management planning, but this usually targets one or a few diseases and may not reflect national capacity to respond.
3. The VS have the legal framework and financial support to respond rapidly to sanitary emergency threats, but the response is not well coordinated through an effective chain of command. They have national emergency management plans for some exotic *diseases*, but they are not updated/tested.
4. The VS have the legal framework and financial support to respond rapidly to sanitary emergencies through an effective chain of command (e.g. establishment of a *containment zone*). The VS have national emergency management plans for major exotic *diseases,* linked to broader national disaster management arrangements, and these are regularly updated/tested such as through simulation exercises.
5. The VS have national emergency management plans for all diseases of concern (and possible emerging infectious diseases), incorporating coordination with national disaster agencies, relevant *Competent Authorities*, producers and other non-government stakeholders. Emergency management planning and response capacity is regularly tested, audited and updated, such as through simulation exercises that test response at all levels. Following emergency events, the VS have a formal 'After Action Review' process as part of continuous improvement.

II-5.a. Findings:

RMI has had no history of responding to animal health or veterinary public health emergencies. No plans exist and no training or simulation exercises have been held.

The VS has no field capability, in addition the majority of staff are based in Majuro, with only two quarantine inspectors on Ebeye and no other staff located in the field.

The Animal and Plant Inspection Act provides the legal basis for declaration of an animal quarantine emergency. The Disaster Risk Management Act (2023), administered by the NDMO, provides the legislative framework for declaration of a national disaster, with 'whole-of-government' support for disaster response. A national quarantine emergency including incursion of pests and diseases may be declared a national disaster by the President, following recommendation by the National Disaster Council.

The Disaster Risk Management Act sets out the organisational structure of any disaster response in RMI. Disaster management is led by a National Disaster Council, made up of senior government officials, with a National Emergency Operations Committee being responsible for disaster preparedness and response operations, in accordance with the National Emergency Response Plan. The NDMO facilitates government agencies, local governments, private sector entities, community groups and individuals to respond to disasters and which includes the preparation of the National Disaster Plans. Each agency is required to develop disaster response and disaster resilience plans – MNRC has not yet completed this task. The disaster resilience plan is to include the financial arrangements to support all aspects of the plan. Local governments must also develop disaster response and disaster resilience

plans. NDMO has conducted simulations and desktop exercises on public health emergencies, but not of animal health or veterinary public health.

Note that there is no reference to animal health emergencies in the Disaster Risk Management Act. A 'health disaster' is defined as 'an event caused by a health incident requiring a disaster response … and includes but is not limited to vector disease outbreaks, virus threats or outbreaks, or epidemic or pandemic threats or outbreaks'.

An incursion of coconut rhinoceros beetle (CRB) (*Oryctes rhinoceros*) in late 2023 was declared a national disaster and emergency response activities were ongoing at the time of mission. Funding for CRB incursion emergency operations was obtained via a grant from the U.S. Forestry Service and not than from RMI Treasury funds.

II-5.b. Strengths:

- Disaster Risk Management Act provides a legislative framework for declaration of a national disaster including of health disasters, but not animal health disasters
- Secretary of MNRC is a member of the National Disaster Council

II-5.c. Weaknesses:

- No experience in preparing for or responding to animal health or veterinary public health emergencies
- No field network
- Agricultural emergencies (including animal diseases) are not specifically listed in the Disaster Risk Management Act
- MNRC has not yet developed disaster response and disaster resilience plans

II-5.d. Recommendations:

- MNRC to develop its disaster response and disaster resilience plans
- MNRC with NDMO to train staff and run simulation exercises
- With local governments develop plans for emergency responses in their jurisdictions

II-5.e. Evidence (as listed in Appendix 5): L1, L2, L4, L5, D9, D11, D17, D18, P13, P14

II-6. DISEASE PREVENTION, CONTROL AND ERADICATION

DEFINITION
The authority and capability of the VS to control or eradicate nationally important diseases present in the country, such as through a combination of vaccination, domestic movement control, establishing *containment zones*, *biosecurity* measures (including farm *biosecurity*), isolation and/or culling/stamping out.
LEVELS OF ADVANCEMENT - 1
1. The VS have no capability to implement animal disease prevention, control or eradication programmes.
2. The VS implement prevention, control or eradication programmes for some diseases and/or in some areas or populations, but with little or no epidemiological, risk-based planning or evaluation of their efficacy and efficiency.
3. The VS implement prevention, control or eradication programmes for some priority *diseases* in some areas or populations. There is variable epidemiological, risk-based planning and evaluation of efficacy and efficiency, with limited progress towards programme goals.
4. The VS implement national prevention, control or eradication programmes for priority *diseases* with a high level of epidemiological, risk-based planning, and continual evaluation of efficacy and efficiency. They have or are progressing towards WOAH official recognition of disease control programmes for relevant diseases. They can demonstrate some progress towards programme goals in reducing or eradicating disease.
5. The VS implement national prevention, control or eradication programmes for all priority *diseases* with scientific evaluation of their efficacy and efficiency consistent with relevant WOAH international standards. They can demonstrate clear progress towards programme goals in reducing or eradicating disease, including achieving or progressing towards official recognition of freedom from relevant diseases.

II-6.a. Findings:

RMI has no control or eradication programmes for any animal diseases or pests.

The VS has the legal authority to control and eradicate nationally important animal diseases but does not have the technical capability or access to the resources required to plan and implement an effective control or eradication programme. Technical advice would need to be sought from international agencies, such as the Land and Resources Division of the PC or other international partners.

II-6.b. Strengths:

- Animal and Plant Inspection Act provides the legal mandate for disease control, and this will be strengthened when the Biosecurity Bill is passed
- Experience in responding to CRB

II-6.c. Weaknesses:

- No experience in controlling animal diseases
- Lack of a veterinarian or veterinary paraprofessional experienced in designing, implementing and monitoring disease control programmes

II-6.d. Recommendations:

- Recruit a veterinarian or veterinary paraprofessional experienced in designing, implementing and monitoring disease control programmes

- Liaise with international agencies and donors on options for developing capacities in disease control

II-6.e. Evidence (as listed in Appendix 5): L1, L2, L5, D9, D16, P5, P6, P13, P14, W3

II-7. ANIMAL PRODUCTION FOOD SAFETY

DEFINITION
The authority and capability of the VS to assure the safety of food of animal origin for domestic and export markets.
A. Regulation, inspection (including audits), authorisation and supervision of establishments for production and processing of food of animal origin.
The authority and capability of the VS to establish and enforce sanitary and food hygiene standards for establishments that produce and process food of animal origin, including slaughter, rendering, dairy, egg, honey and other animal product processing establishments. Includes the regulation, initial authorisation of establishments, and the ongoing inspection of establishments and processes, including the identification of and response to non-compliance, based on HACCP principles. It includes external coordination between *Competent Authorities* as may be required.
LEVELS OF ADVANCEMENT - 1
1. Regulation, authorisation, and inspection of relevant establishments and processes are generally not undertaken in conformity with international standards.
2. Regulation, authorisation and inspection of relevant establishments and processes are undertaken in conformity with international standards in some selected premises (e.g. export premises).
3. Regulation, authorisation and inspection of relevant establishments and processes are undertaken in conformity with international standards in large premises supplying major cities and/or the national market.
4. Regulation, authorisation and inspection of relevant establishments and processes are undertaken in conformity with international standards for premises supplying the national and local markets. There are some reports of dealing with non-compliance.
5. Regulation, authorisation, inspection and audit of relevant establishments and processes are undertaken in conformity with international standards at all premises. There are documented cases of the identification and effective response to non-compliance.

II-7.A.a. Findings:

There is only limited regulation, authorisation, and inspection of butchery shops in the main supermarkets.

Almost all meat and meat products in RMI are imported from the U.S. with a small volume imported from other countries such as New Zealand. Meat is mainly imported already broken down with few carcasses being imported, except for poultry. RMI does not produce meat for export.

Backyard slaughter is commonly practiced for pigs and poultry with no facilities and without any supervision.

The Food Safety Act (2010) of the MoHHS is the key legislation that provides a regulatory framework for the registration and licensing of food businesses, food safety obligations, training of food handlers, declaration of any food as a prohibited product, and food safety and hygiene requirements. The Food Safety Act legislation makes provisions for licensing and inspections of butchery premises for meat processing and storage.

The Food Safety Act legislation does not include specific provisions to regulate meat and meat products from the local slaughter of animals – such as the approval of slaughter facilities, ante- and post-mortem inspection by qualified meat inspectors and of appropriate temperature controls for safe storage and transport.

RMI does not currently have any approved premises for the slaughter and processing of meat and meat products from its domestic livestock. TTM, in partnership with MNRC, is in the process of establishing a slaughterhouse for pigs, with an initial intended objective of processing about 20 animals per day. A potential site for the intended slaughterhouse has been identified and the slaughterhouse is to be commissioned by the end of 2025.

II-7.A.b. Strengths:

- Food Safety Act mandates the registration of butchery and processing establishments
- Advanced plans for establishing a TTM slaughterhouse in Laura

II-7.A.c. Weaknesses:

- Local slaughter is entirely unregulated, and no facilities are available
- MoHHS provide oversight of supermarket butcheries but with only limited compliance

II-7.A.d. Recommendations:

- Provide facilities for local slaughter with appropriate standards of hygiene, waste, animal and meat management with an initial focus on the main population areas of Majuro and Ebeye
- MNRC should work with MoHHS to provide regulation and oversight of all meat processing and butchery facilities

II-7.A.e. Evidence (as listed in Appendix 5): L3, D14, D15

II-7. ANIMAL PRODUCTION FOOD SAFETY

DEFINITION
The authority and capability of the VS to assure the safety of food of animal origin for domestic and export markets.
B. Ante- and post-mortem inspection at slaughter facilities and associated premises.
The authority and capability of the VS to implement and manage the *ante-mortem* inspection of *animals* destined for slaughter and the post-mortem inspection of carcasses and *meat* products at slaughter facilities and associated premises, including to ensure meat hygiene and safety, and for the collection of information relevant to livestock diseases and *zoonoses.* This includes standards relating to *veterinary* and *veterinary para-professional* supervision and inspection, and protocols applied for ante- and post-mortem inspection findings, based on HACCP principles. It includes external coordination between *Competent Authorities* as may be required.
LEVELS OF ADVANCEMENT - NA
1. Ante- and post-mortem inspection is generally not undertaken in conformity with international standards.
2. Ante- and post-mortem inspection with collection of disease information is undertaken in conformity with international standards only in selected premises (e.g. export premises).
3. Ante- and post-mortem inspection with collection of disease information is undertaken in conformity with international standards for export premises and the major abattoirs in the larger cities and/or producing *meat* for distribution throughout the national market.
4. Ante- and post-mortem inspection with collection of disease information is undertaken in conformity with international standards for all slaughter facilities producing *meat* for export, national and local markets.
5. Ante- and post-mortem inspection with collection of disease information is undertaken in conformity with international standards at all premises (including municipal, community, and on-farm slaughtering and distribution) and are subject to periodic audits.

II-7.B.a. Findings:

There is no livestock slaughter facility in RMI for either pigs or poultry, consequently no ante- or post-mortem inspections are undertaken. This CC was considered as 'Not applicable'.

The TTM slaughterhouse to be commissioned by the end of 2025 should operate with ante- and post-mortem inspections. Staff will need to be trained as meat inspectors – courses are available in the region.

II-7.B.b. Strengths:

- No strengths identified

II-7.B.c. Weaknesses:

- No local slaughter of animals in RMI

II-7.B.d. Recommendations:

- Train staff as meat inspectors
- Operations at the TTM slaughterhouse should include ante- and post-mortem inspection

II-7.B.e. Evidence (as listed in Appendix 5): L3, D14, D15

II-8. VETERINARY MEDICINES AND BIOLOGICALS

DEFINITION
The authority and capability of the VS to regulate veterinary medicines, and biologicals, in order to ensure their quality and safety, as well as their responsible and prudent use, including as medicated *feed.* This includes the marketing authorisation/registration, import, manufacture, quality control, export, labelling, advertising, distribution, sale (includes dispensing) and use (includes prescribing) of these products.
LEVELS OF ADVANCEMENT- 1
1. The VS cannot regulate veterinary medicines and biologicals.
2. The VS have some capability to exercise regulatory and administrative control over the import, manufacture and market authorisation (registration) of veterinary medicines and biologicals to ensure their safety and quality, but cannot ensure their responsible and prudent use in the field.
3. The VS exercise effective regulatory and administrative control for the market authorisation of veterinary medicines and biologicals and have some capacity to regulate to ensure their responsible and prudent use in the field, including reducing the risk from illegal imports.
4. The VS exercise comprehensive and effective regulatory and administrative control of all aspects of veterinary medicines and biologicals, including market authorisation, responsible and prudent use in the field, and reducing the risks of illegal distribution and use.
5. The control systems for veterinary medicines and biologicals are regularly audited, tested and updated when necessary, including via an effective pharmacovigilance programme.

II-8.a. Findings:

The Animal and Plant Inspection Act (and its regulations) makes no provision for the regulation of the entry and use of veterinary medicines and biologicals. MoHHS has legislation to ensure imported medical medicines meet appropriate safety standards and to prevent the entry of counterfeit products.

The Biosecurity Bill does not currently address the issue of the import, distribution and use of veterinary medicines and biologicals.

Importers of veterinary medicines and biologicals (TTM and RMI Love Animals) liaise with the RMI quarantine service who provide an approval letter for the import of veterinary medicines and biologicals that is required by the regulatory authority of the exporting country. There are no other importers of veterinary medicines and biologicals to RMI, and this includes MNRC.

TTM and RMI Love Animals are the only importers and users of veterinary medicines and biologicals. There are no private human pharmacies or agricultural shops/pharmacies in the country and no veterinary medicines and biologicals are stocked at the hospital pharmacies.

Neither TTM or RMI Love Animals have good stock control with many outdated and poorly stored products.

II-8.b. Strengths:

- MNRC's Division of Quarantine must approve the import of veterinary medicines and biologicals
- No retail outlets for veterinary medicines and biologicals and so no informal purchase or use in RMI

II-8.c. Weaknesses:

- Lack of current legislation addressing veterinary medicines and biologicals
- Poor local storage and stock control of veterinary medicines by TTM and RMI Love Animals

II-8.d. Recommendations:

- Develop legislation that regulates the import, distribution and use of veterinary medicines and biologicals – if not too late in the legislative programme this should be added to the Biosecurity Bill
- Improve storage and record keeping of veterinary medicines by TTM and RMI Love Animals

II-8.e. Evidence (as listed in Appendix 5): D2, D9, D10, P5, P6

II-9. ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE (AMR) AND ANTIMICROBIAL USE (AMU)

DEFINITION
The authority and capability of the VS to manage AMR and AMU, and to undertake surveillance and control of the development and spread of AMR pathogens in animal production and animal origin food products, via a One Health approach.
LEVELS OF ADVANCEMENT - 1
1. The VS cannot regulate or control AMR and AMU, and have not developed or contributed to an AMR action plan covering the veterinary domain.
2. The VS are contributing or have contributed to a national AMR action plan. The action plan has initiated some activities to collect AMU/AMR data or control AMR e.g. awareness campaigns targeting *veterinarians* or farmers on the prudent use of *antimicrobial agents (*antimicrobials*).* The use of antimicrobials for growth promotion is discouraged.
3. The VS have defined a national AMR action plan in coordination with the Public Health authorities and other stakeholders, and are implementing some AMU/AMR surveillance and regulations. The use of antimicrobials for growth promotion is prohibited.
4. The VS are implementing a comprehensive AMR action plan based on risk, including AMR surveillance of the most important pathogens for animal health or food-borne diseases, the *monitoring* of AMU, and the prudent use of antimicrobials in *animals* (especially the use of critically important antimicrobials). The use of antimicrobials for growth promotion does not occur.
5. An effective national AMR action plan covering the veterinary domain is regularly audited, reviewed and updated by the VS with the Public Health authorities and other stakeholders, using the results of AMU/AMR surveillance. The scale and type of antimicrobial usage in *animals* poses minimal risk of AMR and alternative solutions for the control of diseases in *animals* are being implemented.

II-9.a. Findings:

As per CCII.8, there is no legislation governing the use of antimicrobials, or other veterinary medicines, in livestock or companion animals.

The domestic livestock sector on RMI is limited to a small population of pigs and poultry; animal census data is not available. Smallholder farmers have no access to antimicrobial agents/medicines. MNRC does not hold or dispense antimicrobials, or other medicines.

TTM imports small quantities of antimicrobials and other medicines from Taiwan to treat its pigs. These include a wide range of antimicrobials. No treatment is provided by TTM veterinarians or paravets to associated pig farmers of the Laura Farmers Association.

RMI Love Animals imports a wide range of antimicrobials but only in very limited quantities. No records are kept of usage.

A National AMR Action Plan has been developed, led by MoHHS. MNRC was not engaged in the AMR planning process. MNRC undertakes no AMR activities.

MoHHS undertakes basic antimicrobial sensitivity testing, using plates and rapid test kits.

II-9.b. Strengths:

- A national AMR plan is in place, led by the MoHHS
- Very limited use of antimicrobials by TTM and RMI Love Animals

II-9.c. Weaknesses:

- MNRC has no technical capacity or legislative authority to regulate antimicrobial usage in livestock or companion animals, nor were they included in the development of the National AMR Action Plan
- Limited recording of the use of antimicrobials by TTM and RMI Love Animals

II-9.d. Recommendations:

- Ensure MNRC is engaged in reviews and updates of the National AMR Action Plan
- Update veterinary legislation with reference to international standards to control and restrict antimicrobial usage in animals
- Implement robust monitoring and record keeping of antimicrobial use

II-9.e. Evidence (as listed in Appendix 5): D9, D10, P7

II-10. RESIDUE TESTING, MONITORING AND MANAGEMENT

DEFINITION
The capability of the VS to undertake residue testing and *monitoring* programmes for veterinary medicines (e.g. antimicrobials and hormones), chemicals, pesticides, radionuclides, heavy metals, etc. and respond appropriately to adverse findings.
LEVELS OF ADVANCEMENT – 1
1. No residue testing for animal products is being undertaken.
2. Some residue testing is being undertaken, such as for research or pilot purposes and/or it is conducted only on specific animal products for export.
3. A comprehensive residue *monitoring* programme is conducted for all animal products for export and some for domestic consumption based on limited *risk analysis*. Documented protocols exist for preventing residue risks (e.g. withholding periods for veterinary drugs) and for responding to breaches of Maximum Residue Limits.
4. A comprehensive residue *monitoring* programme is conducted for all animal products for export and domestic consumption based on *risk analysis*. Effective protocols both reduce residue risks and respond to breaches of Maximum Residue Limits, including traceback and follow up.
5. The residue *monitoring* and *risk management* programme is subject to routine quality assurance and regular evaluation/audit.

II-10.a. Findings:

Almost all meat and meat products are imported from the U.S. and a few other countries and would be subjected to the exporting country residue testing and management programmes.

There is no residue testing, monitoring or management programme for meat and meat products derived from pigs or poultry raised in the RMI.

The Food Safety Act (2010) provides for product testing as a food safety intervention rather than a production monitoring programme for residues.

The establishment of a slaughterhouse by TTM should address the issue of residue monitoring.

To comply with international standards, any residue monitoring programme would need to be done via shipment of specimens to an international laboratory with an appropriate testing and quality management system, as there is no capacity in the country.

II-10.b. Strengths:

- Only TTM use veterinary medicines in their production of pigs; smallholders have no access to antimicrobials
- One paravet completed a food safety course in Japan, though this capability is not being used

II-10.c. Weaknesses:

- No capacity to conduct residue monitoring tests in country or to send samples for residue testing out of the country
- No veterinarian or paravet to monitor livestock production systems for residue risks and testing

II-10.d. Recommendations:

- Undertake a risk assessment of likely residues and develop a programme of residue monitoring with dispatch of samples out of the country for testing
- Recruit a veterinarian or paravet to monitor livestock production systems for residue risks and testing

II-10.e. Evidence (as listed in Appendix 5): D10

II-11. ANIMAL FEED SAFETY

DEFINITION
The authority and capability of the VS to regulate animal *feed* safety e.g. processing, handling, storage, distribution and use of both commercial and on-farm produced animal *feed* and *feed* ingredients. This includes *feed* safety risks such as swill feeding, feeding by-products, ruminant *feed* bans, the use of antimicrobials in *feed*, as well as managing risks of microbial, physical and toxin contamination of *feed*.
LEVELS OF ADVANCEMENT - 1
1. The VS cannot regulate animal *feed* safety.
2. The VS have some capability to exercise regulatory and administrative control over animal *feed* safety.
3. The VS exercise regulatory and administrative control for most aspects of animal *feed* safety.
4. The VS exercise comprehensive and effective regulatory and administrative control of animal *feed* safety.
5. The control systems are regularly audited, tested and updated when necessary.

II-11.a. Findings:

The Animal and Plant Inspection Act (and its regulations) makes no provision for the regulation or safety of either imported or locally produced animal feedstuffs.

The majority of animal feedstuffs in RMI are imported and the safety of such animal feedstuffs would depend on the monitoring programmes in place in the exporting country. Copra meal is the only locally produced animal feedstuff. TTM imports animal feed form Taiwan – a country officially recognised as ASF-free by WOAH.

ASF is a recognised risk to the country and the feeding of uncooked swill should be prohibited. This requires regulations, an awareness programme and monitoring/enforcement. It is recognised that border controls (CC II.3) form the first line of defence against the introduction of ASF.

There are no ruminants in the country so the ruminant feed ban to prevent BSE is not required.

II-11.b. Strengths:

- Division of Quarantine monitor the certification of imported animal feeds and feedstuffs.
- No ruminants in RMI

II-11.c. Weaknesses:

- No legislation to regulate animal feed safety
- No swill feeding ban or control programme

II-11.d. Recommendations:

- Revise and update VS legislation to comply with international standards on animal feed safety – the Animal and Plan Inspection Act and the Biosecurity Bill
- Develop a swill feeding ban or control programme

II-11.e. Evidence (as listed in Appendix 5): P5, P6, P8

II-12. IDENTIFICATION, TRACEABILITY AND MOVEMENT CONTROL

DEFINITION
A. Premises, herd, batch and animal identification, tracing and movement control
The authority and capability of the VS, in coordination with producers and other stakeholders, to regulate the identification of *animal*s, to trace their history and location(s), and to control domestic movements for the purpose of animal disease control, food safety, trade or other legal requirements under the VS mandate.
LEVELS OF ADVANCEMENT - 1
1. The VS do not have the authority or the capability to regulate the identification of *animals*, either individually, by batch, or by premises, or to trace and control their movements.
2. The VS can identify some *animals* by premises or location and control some movements, using traditional methods, and can demonstrate the ability to deal with a specific problem (e.g. to trace sampled or vaccinated *animals* for follow up, or to prevent theft).
3. The VS implement a system for *animal identification, traceability* and movement control for specific animal sub-populations (e.g. for export, at borders, specified *zones* or markets) as required for traceability and/or disease control, in accordance with international standards.
4. The VS implement appropriate and effective *animal identification, traceability* and movement control procedures for some animal species at national level, in accordance with international standards.
5. The VS carry out periodic audits of the effectiveness of their identification, traceability and movement control systems. They have been demonstrated as effective in dealing with a problem (e.g. tracing a disease *outbreak*, residue or other food safety incident).

II-12.A.a. Findings:

There is no programme for premises, herd, batch and animal identification, tracing and movement control in RMI.

The Animal and Plant Inspection Act is the key legislation for animal disease management and provides for emergency management measures including quarantine zones and movement controls.

Authority to regulate livestock/animal identification (e.g.by branding/tattoo/microchip) and tracing (e.g. by premises/farm registration), as would generally be provided under alternative legislation (e.g. Livestock Management/Stock Act/Animal Control legislation) is not available.

Companion animals, mainly dogs and cats, are microchipped for blood testing for health certification prior to export.

II-12.A.b. Strengths:

- The many atolls and islands provide physical barriers that would aid movement control of animals and animal products
- Companion animals microchipped prior to health certification for export
- Movement control in place between the atolls and islands for the control of CRB

II-12.A.c. Weaknesses:

- Lack of legislation covering animal identification, traceability and movement control systems

II-12.A.d. Recommendations:

- Update VS legislation with regard to international standards for animal identification, traceability and movement control systems – the Animal and Plan Inspection Act and the Biosecurity Bill
- Explore potential training opportunities with development partners in animal identification, movement controls and traceability systems appropriate for RMI.

II-12.A.e. Evidence (as listed in Appendix 5): L1, L5

II-12. IDENTIFICATION, TRACEABILITY AND MOVEMENT CONTROL

DEFINITION
B. Identification, traceability and control of products of animal origin
The capability of the *Veterinary Authority*, in coordination with *Competent Authorities* (such as food safety authorities) and other stakeholders as appropriate, to achieve whole-of-chain traceability, including the identification, tracing and control of products of animal origin for the purpose of food safety, animal health or trade.
LEVELS OF ADVANCEMENT - 1
1. The VS do not have the capability or access to information to identify or trace products of animal origin.
2. The VS can identify and trace some products of animal origin, by coordination between *Competent Authorities*, to deal with a specific problem (e.g. high risk products traced back to premises of origin).
3. The VS have implemented procedures to identify and trace some products of animal origin, in coordination with *Competent Authorities*, for food safety, animal health and trade purposes, in accordance with international standards.
4. The VS have implemented national programmes enabling them to identify and trace all products of animal origin, and respond to threats, in coordination with *Competent Authorities*, in accordance with international standards.
5. The VS periodically audit the effectiveness of their identification and traceability procedures, in coordination with *Competent Authorities*. The procedures have been demonstrated as being effective for traceback and response to a relevant food safety incident (e.g. foodborne zoonoses or residue incident).

II-12.B.a. Findings:

There is no programme for the identification, traceability and control of products of animal origin in RMI.

The meat and meat products in supermarkets are imported from the U.S., with a small volume imported from other countries such as New Zealand. Details of imported meat and meat products (e.g. country of origin, producer, production date, packing date, batch number), the importer and date of importation are recorded in the ASYCUDA database administered by Customs. If a specific food safety issue occurred (e.g. product recall) the information recorded in ASYCUDA would allow MNRC's Division of Quarantine to trace imported meat and meat products to the point of sale (e.g. supermarkets).

There is no technical capability or authority to trace locally produced meat or animal products. Locally produced meat and meat products produced by smallholders are understood to be informally supplied to food outlets (e.g. cafes, restaurants) with no identification or traceability.

Establishing a local slaughterhouse, in partnership with TTM, for the local production of pig meat should include development of product identification and traceability.

II-12.B.b. Strengths:

- Customs use the ASYCUDA database for imported meat and meat products and this allows identification of products for recall to the point of repacking and/or retail

II-12.B.c. Weaknesses:

- No legislation requiring product identification and traceability of meat and animal products.

II-12.B.d. Recommendations:

- Update VS legislation with reference to international standards for product identification and traceability of meat and animal products
- Explore training opportunities with development partners in product identification and traceability systems appropriate for RMI

II-12.B.e. Evidence (as listed in Appendix 5): L1, L5

II-13. ANIMAL WELFARE

DEFINITION
The authority and capability of the VS to legislate and implement the *animal welfare* standards of WOAH as published in the *Terrestrial Code.* This requires consultation and coordination with *Competent Authorities*, non- governmental organisations and other stakeholders, as appropriate.
LEVELS OF ADVANCEMENT - 1
1. There is no national legislation or regulations on *animal welfare*.
2. There is limited national legislation or regulations on *animal welfare* covering some of the WOAH standards, with limited stakeholder or public awareness.
3. The national *veterinary legislation* (including laws and regulations) on *animal welfare* cover most WOAH standards, with some awareness programmes and implementation, but are in conformity with international standards in only some sectors (e.g. for the export sector).
4. *Animal welfare* programmes, supported by suitable *veterinary legislation*, are being implemented in conformity with relevant international standards and are applied to most sectors and species with stakeholders and public awareness. Documented compliance programmes, including consequences of non-compliance are available.
5. *Animal welfare* programmes, supported by suitable *veterinary legislation*, are being implemented in conformity with relevant international standards. Comprehensive national programmes are applied to all sectors and species with the active involvement of stakeholders. The *animal* welfare programmes, including non-compliance issues, are subject to regular audit and review, with documented cases of responding effectively to non-compliance.

II-13.a. Findings:

There is no national legislation on animal welfare in RMI.

The priority of MNRC's Divisions of Agriculture and Quarantine is the improvement of food security including improving animal production, animal health and disease control.

MNRC supports RMI Love Animals and their promotion of improved population and disease control by running sterilisation and vaccination programmes. These activities support the welfare of companion animals in RMI by promoting animal health through reduced disease incidence, improved population management with reduced fighting and fewer litters, but are currently only active on Majuro.

II-13.b. Strengths:

- RMI Love Animals is delivering an effective programme of political engagement and increased community commitment to animal welfare

II-13.c. Weaknesses:

- No animal welfare legislation in the current Animal and Plant Inspection or proposed Biosecurity Acts
- No veterinarian and/or paravets with animal welfare expertise/training
- RMI Love Animals programmes only runs three to four times annually and generally only on Majuro, with their presence limited by the availability of budget

II-13.d. Recommendations:

- Liaise with development partners (e.g. PC/FAO/WOAH) to develop an animal welfare strategy that includes community consultation, paravet training, establishment of legislation relevant to international standards, communication and awareness programmes.
- Recruit a veterinarian and explore training opportunities for paravets in animal welfare
- Seek options to extend the RMI Love Animals programme to be present more continuously in the country and to extend their operations in other atolls and islands

II-13.e. Evidence (as listed in Appendix 5): L1, L5, P5, P6, W4

III.3 Fundamental component III: Interaction with stakeholders

This component of the evaluation concerns the capability of the VS to collaborate with and involve non-government stakeholders including the private sector, Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) and civil society organisations (including consumer organisations) in the implementation of programmes and activities. This also includes relevant state-owned enterprises, research institutions, universities and other training establishments.

Critical Competencies:

Section III-1	**Communication**
Section III-2	**Consultation with stakeholders**
Section III-3	**Official representation and international collaboration**
Section III-4	**Accreditation/ authorisation/ delegation**
Section III-5	**Regulation of the profession by the Veterinary Statutory Body (VSB)**
Section III-6	**Participation of producers and other stakeholders in joint programmes**
Section III-7	**Veterinary clinical services**

Terrestrial Code References:

Points 6, 7, 9 and 13 of Article 3.1.2. on Fundamental principles of quality: Veterinary legislation/General organisation/Procedures and standards/Communication.

Point 9 of Article 3.2.1. on General considerations.

Points 2 and 7 of Article 3.2.3. on Evaluation criteria for the organisational structure of the Veterinary Services.

Sub-point b) of Point 2 of Article 3.2.6. on Administrative resources: Communications.

Article 3.2.11. on Participation on WOAH activities.

Article 3.2.12. on Evaluation of the veterinary statutory body.

Points 4, 8 and Sub-point g) of Point 10 of Article 3.2.14. on Administration details/Animal health, animal welfare and veterinary public health controls/Sources of independent scientific expertise.

Chapter 3.3. on Communication.

Point 4 of Article 3.4.3. on General principles: Consultation.

Article 3.4.5. on Competent Authorities.

Article 3.4.6. on Veterinarians and veterinary paraprofessionals.

III-1. COMMUNICATION

DEFINITION
The capability of the VS to keep non- government stakeholders aware and informed, in a transparent, effective and timely manner, of VS activities and programmes, and of developments in animal health, *animal welfare* and veterinary public health. This competency includes communication with all non-government stakeholders, including industry groups/associations (such as livestock farmer, meat sector, dairy sector and trading groups), as well as relevant NGOs and the general public, such as via communication campaigns and the media, including social media.
LEVELS OF ADVANCEMENT - 2
1. The VS do not inform stakeholders of VS activities and programmes.
2. The VS have informal communication mechanisms with some stakeholders (e.g. with the larger commercial livestock or related companies).
3. The VS maintain a dedicated and specialist communications function which communicates with stakeholders occasionally, but it is not always up-to-date or pro-active in providing information.
4. The VS contact point or unit for communication provides up-to-date information to most relevant stakeholders. This information is aligned with a well-developed communications plan, and accessible via the Internet and other appropriate channels targeted to the audience, and covers relevant events, activities and programmes, including during crises.
5. The VS have a well-developed communications plan, and regularly circulate information to all relevant stakeholders, well targeted to the audience via the full range of communications media, including social media. The VS regularly evaluate and revise their communications plan.

III-1.a. Findings:

MNRC has no established programmes in animal health, animal welfare or veterinary public health. The VS have no communications programmes to inform producers, communities or others of their policies, programmes or activities.

RMI Love Animals provides alerts of their activities when foreign veterinary teams are visiting RMI.

In response to the CRB incursion MNRC implemented a campaign, with international support, to combat the pest. It is expected that if a TAD were to occur in RMI a communications and awareness programme would be implemented.

MNRC has a budget for communications – USD 35,000 in 2024/25

III-1.b. Strengths:

- CRB programme
- MRNC has a communications budget
- RMI Love Animals alerts the public to veterinary visits

III-1.c. Weaknesses:

- Limited quarantine communications to raise awareness
- No other communications on VS policies or activities

III-1.d. Recommendations:

- Develop quarantine communications materials to raise awareness of risks

- Develop Information, Education and Communications programmes to develop community awareness and capabilities to support VS policies and activities
- Strengthen interaction with RMI Love Animals, TTM, Laura Farmers Association.

III-1.e. Evidence (as listed in Appendix 5): P5, P6 , P13, P14

III-2. CONSULTATION WITH STAKEHOLDERS

DEFINITION
The capability of the VS to consult effectively with non-government stakeholders on VS policies and programmes, and on developments in animal health and food safety. This competency includes consultation with all non-government stakeholders, including industry groups/associations (such as livestock farmer, meat sector, dairy sector and trading groups), as well as interested NGOs and members of the public. Unlike communication (CCIII-1), consultation is two way and should involve mechanisms that not only inform, but actively seek views of consulted parties, for consideration and response.
LEVELS OF ADVANCEMENT - 2
1. The VS have no mechanisms for consultation with non-government stakeholders.
2. The VS maintain informal channels of consultation with some non-government stakeholders (e.g. only the larger commercial livestock or related companies).
3. The VS hold formal consultations with non-government stakeholders, usually represented by industry groups or associations.
4. The VS regularly hold workshops and meetings with non-government stakeholders, who are organised to have broad representation, such as through elected, self-financed industry groups or associations. Consultation outcomes are documented and the views of stakeholders considered and occasionally incorporated.
5. The VS actively consult with all non-government stakeholders, including representatives of smaller producers, regarding current and proposed policies and programmes, developments in animal health and food safety, and proposed interventions at the OIE, Codex Alimentarius Commission, WTO SPS Committee, etc. The consultation results in improved, better adapted activities and greater stakeholder support.

III-2.a. Findings:

The VS has no ongoing consultations with non-government stakeholders.

In the development of the Biosecurity bill consultations have been held with private sector stakeholders

The Laura Famers Association is the only livestock producing organisation in the country.

RMI Love Animals engages with animal owners and community and political leaders and is a critical resource for developing VS policies and programmes for companion animals, particularly dogs.

III-2.b. Strengths

- Consultations held in developing new legislation
- Laura Farmers Association is an industry group that can be used for consultations on developing new VS policies and programmes
- RMI Love Animals is an interest group that can be consulted on the development and implementation of VS policies and programmes primarily for companion animals

III-2.c. Weaknesses:

- No formal consultation programmes in place
- There is only one livestock producers association in the country – the Laura Famers Association

III-2.d. Recommendations:

- Expand consultations with producers – Laura Famers Association and others as they are developed
- Engage with RMI Love Animals to review and update VS policies and programmes for companion animals

III-2.e. Evidence (as listed in Appendix 5): L5

III-3. OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION AND INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION

DEFINITION
The capability of the VS to regularly and actively participate, coordinate and provide follow-up on relevant meetings and activities of regional and international organisations including WOAH, Codex Alimentarius Commission, WTO SPS Committee, WHO, FAO and Regional Economic Communities.
LEVELS OF ADVANCEMENT - 2
1. The VS do not participate in or follow up on relevant meetings or activities of regional or international organisations.
2. The VS sporadically participate in relevant meetings or activities and/or make a limited contribution.
3. The VS actively participate in the majority of relevant meetings and activities, and provide some feedback to national colleagues.
4. The VS consult with non-government stakeholders and take into consideration their opinions in developing papers and making interventions in relevant meetings, and in following up on meeting outcomes at national or regional level.
5. The VS consult with non-government stakeholders to provide leadership, to ensure that strategic issues are identified, and to ensure coordination among national delegations as part of their participation in relevant meetings and follow up on meeting outcomes at national and/or regional levels. The VS collaborate internationally by sharing information and assisting to build capacity where appropriate.

III-3.a. Findings:

MNRC staff participate in many international meetings including regional PC and FAO meetings and less frequently meetings further afield. MNRC have a budget for international meetings and support is also sometimes provided by the international agency or a donor.

MNRC has video conferencing facility and good internet connection so staff are also able to participate in meetings online.

III-3.b. Strengths:

- Participation in many international meetings
- Participation in online meetings

III-3.c. Weaknesses:

- No government veterinarians so no prioritisation of VS, animal health, veterinary public health or animal welfare meetings
- RMI is not a member of WOAH
- International flights are infrequent and expensive from RMI

III-3.d. Recommendations:

- Become a member of WOAH
- Recruit a veterinarians(s) and develop capacity and capabilities in joining VS, animal health, veterinary public health or animal welfare programmes and meetings nationally and internationally
- Seek support from international agencies and donors to participate in international meetings

III-3.e. Evidence (as listed in Appendix 5): D6

III-4. ACCREDITATION/AUTHORISATION/DELEGATION

DEFINITION
The authority and capability of the public sector of the VS to accredit/authorise/delegate to private sector or NGO expertise (e.g. private *veterinarians* and *laboratories*, *animal welfare* NGOs), to carry out official tasks on their behalf, usually via a formal agreement (i.e. public-private partnership).
LEVELS OF ADVANCEMENT – 1
1. The public sector of the VS has neither the authority nor the capability to accredit/authorise/delegate to the private sector or NGOs official tasks.
2. The public sector of the VS has the authority or capability to accredit/authorise/delegate official tasks to the private sector or NGOs, but there are currently no accreditation/authorisation/delegation activities.
3. The public sector of the VS develops accreditation/authorisation/delegation programmes for certain tasks using formal agreements, but these activities are not routinely reviewed.
4. The public sector of the VS develops and implements accreditation/authorisation/delegation programmes using formal agreements, and these activities are routinely reviewed to maintain standards and manage performance.
5. The public sector of the VS carries out audits of its accreditation/authorisation/delegation programmes, in order to maintain the trust of their trading partners and other stakeholders.

III-4.a. Findings:

The VS do not formally accredit, authorise or delegate any tasks to the private sector or NGOs.

RMI Love Animals are supported by MNRC but do not have any formal mandate to operate in the country.

TTM has the capability to provide clinical services to pig producers in the Laura District and do provide advice but are unable to provide any treatments.

III-4.b. Strengths:

- TTM provides technical oversight and advice to pig producers
- RMI Love Animals provide some clinical services, sterilisation and vaccination of dogs and other companion animals, and are supported by MNRC

III-4.c. Weaknesses:

- No formal accreditation, authorisation or delegation of any official tasks

III-4.d. Recommendations:

- Implement programme of formal accreditation, authorisation or delegation of TTM and RMI Love Animals to undertake official tasks
- Identify other stakeholders and interested groups for consideration of further delegation of government official tasks

III-4.e. Evidence (as listed in Appendix 5):

III-5. REGULATION OF THE PROFESSION BY THE VETERINARY STATUTORY BODY (VSB)

DEFINITION
The authority and capacity of the *VSB* to effectively and independently maintain educational and professional standards for *veterinarians and veterinary paraprofessionals.* Regulation includes licensing or registration of those *veterinarians* and *veterinary paraprofessionals* that meet educational standards, and the ongoing oversight of their professional competence and conduct.
LEVELS OF ADVANCEMENT – 1
1. There is no *VSB*.
2. The *VSB* regulates *veterinarians* only within certain sectors of the veterinary profession and/or does not systematically apply educational standards or disciplinary measures.
3. The *VSB* regulates *veterinarians* in all sectors of the veterinary profession setting educational standards and applying disciplinary measures.
4. The *VSB* regulates *veterinarians* in all sectors and some *veterinary paraprofessionals* in a transparent manner. It has defined one or more specific categories of *veterinary paraprofessional* and their qualifications for initial and ongoing registration.
5. The *VSB* regulates and applies disciplinary measures to *veterinarians* and *veterinary paraprofessionals* in all sectors throughout the country. *Veterinarians* and *veterinary paraprofessionals* are required to undertake continuing education to maintain their professional registration.

III-5.a. Findings:

The only veterinarians that are resident in RMI are the two employed by the TTM project. Periodic veterinary missions take place from the U.S. to sterilise and vaccinate dogs.

The TTM veterinarians obtain RMI work permits but there is no assessment of their qualifications.

There is no VSB in the country that covers either the veterinarians visiting or operating in country, or the paravets.

III-5.b. Strengths:

- No strengths identified

III-5.c. Weaknesses:

- No registration or governing body for veterinarians or the paravets
- No government veterinarians in RMI
- No assessment of the qualifications of TTM veterinarians

III-5.d. Recommendations:

- Establish a protocol for visiting veterinarians that requires a review of their qualifications and approval of their work in RMI
- Develop a licensing/registration system for paravets

III-5.e. Evidence (as listed in Appendix 5):

III-6. PARTICIPATION OF PRODUCERS AND OTHER STAKEHOLDERS IN JOINT PROGRAMMES

DEFINITION
The capability of the VS to develop joint programmes (public-private partnerships) with producers and non-government stakeholders to deliver animal health, veterinary public health, food safety and/or *animal welfare* outcomes.
LEVELS OF ADVANCEMENT - 2
1. Producers and other non-government stakeholders do not participate in joint programmes.
2. Producers and other non-government stakeholders are informed of programmes by the VS and informally assist the VS in programme delivery in the field (e.g. industry groups helping to communicate the programme with their membership).
3. Producers and other non-government stakeholders formally participate with the VS in the delivery of joint programmes and advise of needed changes and improvements.
4. Representatives of producers and other non-government stakeholders actively partner with the VS to plan, manage and implement joint programmes.
5. Producers and other non-government stakeholders contribute resources and may lead the development and delivery of effective joint programmes with the VS. They also actively participate in their regular review, audit and revision.

III-6.a. Findings:

The Laura Farmers Association has nearly 100 members and is working in close association with MNRC and TTM to increase the production of pigs and other agricultural products in Laura District. Pig production is being supported by technical oversight, including monthly visits by TTM veterinarians and MNRC paravets. Support includes providing advice on general husbandry, breeding, nutrition and biosecurity.

Currently there is no commercial or large scale poultry production in RMI. Backyard chicken are reared in small numbers but mostly for home consumption.

The RMI Love Animals NGO supports dog control and animal welfare by providing advice to the community and supporting in-country missions that sterilise and vaccinate dogs. Visits are taking place three to four times annually.

III-6.b. Strengths:

- Laura Farmers Association established and pig production being successfully expanded
- TTM provides technical support to the Laura Farmers Association
- RMI Love Animals has an ongoing programme for dog sterilisation and vaccination

III-6.c. Weaknesses:

- The Laura Farmers Association is the only established public-private partnership in the country
- The NGO, RMI Love Animals, only provides intermittent services to dog and pet owners

III-6.d. Recommendations:

- Extend the Laura Farmers Association locally and establish further public-private partnerships in other areas of the country

- Advocate/support the development of RMI Love Animals capabilities, or establish other entities, to provide animal owners with ongoing access to health care

III-6.e. Evidence (as listed in Appendix 5): L5, P5, P6, P12

III-7. VETERINARY CLINICAL SERVICES

DEFINITION
The availability and quality of veterinary clinical services to meet the needs of animal owners, including their access to animal disease or injury diagnosis and treatment.
LEVELS OF ADVANCEMENT – 1
1. There are no/few clinical services provided from either the public or private sector.
2. Clinical services are available to animal owners in some areas but the quality and coverage (i.e. access to qualified *veterinarians* and/or *veterinary paraprofessionals)* is highly variable.
3. Clinical services are available to most animal owners via the public and/or private sector. In rural areas this is delivered mostly by *veterinary paraprofessionals* with some formal training and some veterinary supervision – but providing only basic clinical diagnosis and treatment.
4. Clinical services are available to all animal owners via an efficient network of veterinary clinics, including in rural areas, serviced by qualified *veterinarians* assisted by *veterinary paraprofessionals.* Diagnoses are generally made prior to treatment, including with supporting *laboratory* tests where appropriate and professional standards are maintained by a well-functioning VSB.
5. Clinical services are available to all animal owners through qualified *veterinarians*, with appropriate facilities, diagnostic equipment and treatments, and the opportunity for specialist referral if required.

III-7.a. Findings:

Clinical services for animal owners including their access to animal disease or injury diagnosis and treatment are not generally available in RMI.

The two veterinarians working at the TTM provide clinical services to the project pigs and have access to a range of veterinary products. These veterinarians provide advisory services to the Laura Farmers Association but do not provide any veterinary medicine for sick, injured or otherwise compromised animals.

Visiting veterinarians working through the NGO, RMI Love Animals, undertake missions three to four times annually primarily to sterilise and vaccinate dogs. Some clinical examinations are undertaken during these missions and treatment can be provided. At other times of the year no clinical services are available in RMI, though sometimes animals are treated by unqualified staff with stored materials left by the visiting veterinary teams.

The paravets have received the PC led training in basic skills in animal science including understanding the normal, healthy animal, animal handling, assessment of an animal's clinical health or debility, and a simple understanding of therapeutics. Veterinary medicines are not available to the paravets and no drug treatments are provided.

There are no clinical facilities in RMI.

III-7.b. Strengths:

- Periodic visits by RMI, Love Animals veterinarians
- Animal husbandry advice provided by TTM veterinarians to the Laura Farmers Association
- Basic training of paravets in clinical examination and treatments

III-7.c. Weaknesses:

- Clinical services are not generally available in any form
- TTM veterinarians do not provide veterinary products to their client farms

- Paravets have no access to veterinary products

III-7.d. Recommendations:

- Prioritise establishment of clinical services initially by the paravets and, in time, by veterinarians. Priority should be given to providing services in the more urban areas of the country (Majuro and Ebeye) and to pig producers
- Refresh training and allow paravets to have some access to a restricted list of veterinary medicines (under veterinary supervision e.g. TTM)
- Discuss with the TTM veterinarians options for providing clinical services to their client farms (e.g. treatments for external parasites such as lice/mites)

III-7.e. Evidence (as listed in Appendix 5): L5, P5, P6, P12, W1, W2, W4

III.4 Fundamental component IV: Access to markets

This component of the evaluation concerns the authority and capability of the VS to provide support by demonstrating the overall integrity of its animal health and veterinary public health system in order to access, expand and retain regional and international markets for animals and animal products.

Critical Competencies:

Section IV-1	**Veterinary legislation**
	A. Legal quality and coverage
	B. Implementation and compliance
Section IV-2	**International harmonisation**
Section IV-3	**International certification**
Section IV-4	**Equivalence and other types of sanitary agreements**
Section IV-5	**Transparency**
Section IV-6	**Zoning**
Section IV-7	**Compartmentalisation**

Terrestrial Code References:
Points 6, 7 and 9 of Article 3.1.2. on Fundamental principles of quality: Veterinary legislation/General organisation/Procedures and standards.
Points 1 and 2 of Article 3.2.7. on Legislation and functional capabilities: Animal health, animal welfare and veterinary public health/Export/import inspection.
Points 1 and 3 of Article 3.2.8. on Animal health controls: Animal health status/National animal disease reporting systems.
Sub-point g) of Point 4 of Article 3.2.10. on Veterinary Services administration: Trade performance history.
Article 3.2.11. on Participation in WOAH activities.
Points 7 and 11 of Article 3.2.14. on Veterinary legislation, regulations and functional capabilities/Membership of the WOAH.
Chapter 3.4. on Veterinary legislation.
Chapter 4.3. on Zoning and compartmentalisation.
Chapter 4.4. on Application of compartmentalisation.
Chapter 5.1. on General obligations related to certification.
Chapter 5.2. on Certification procedures.
Chapter 5.3. on WOAH procedures relevant to the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures of the World Trade Organization.
Chapters 5.10. to 5.13. on Model international veterinary certificates.

IV-1. VETERINARY LEGISLATION

DEFINITION
The effectiveness of *veterinary legislation* (including laws and regulations).
A. Legal quality and coverage
The authority and capability of the VS to develop and update *veterinary legislation*, to ensure its quality and coverage of the veterinary domain. This competency covers the quality of legislation considering the principles of legal drafting, its impact, and suitability for implementation. This competency includes formal collaboration with expert legal drafters and lawyers, other relevant ministries and *Competent Authorities*, national agencies and decentralised institutions that share authority or have mutual interest in relevant areas of the veterinary domain. It also includes consultation with stakeholders that may affect or be affected by the *veterinary legislation*.
LEVELS OF ADVANCEMENT - 2
1. *Veterinary legislation* is lacking, outdated or of poor quality. The VS do not have the authority or capability to develop and update *veterinary legislation.*
2. *Veterinary legislation* covers some fields of the veterinary domain. The VS, working occasionally with expert legal drafters and lawyers, have some authority and capability to develop and update *veterinary legislation.*
3. *Veterinary legislation* covers most fields of the veterinary domain, including those fields under other Competent Authorities. The VS, working in formal partnership with expert legal drafters and lawyers, have the authority and capability to develop and update national *veterinary legislation,* including via consultation with stakeholders, to ensure its legal quality and applicability.
4. *Veterinary legislation* covers the entire veterinary domain. The VS have the authority and the capability to develop and update *veterinary legislation* at national (and sub-national where relevant) level – using a formal methodology which considers international standards, consultation with stakeholders, legal quality and applicability, and regulatory impact.
5. *Veterinary legislation* comprehensively covers the entire veterinary domain. The VS regularly evaluate and update *veterinary legislation* at national (and sub-national where relevant) level, with reference to ongoing effectiveness and changing international standards and science.

IV-1.A.a. Findings:

The primary legislation for the VS is the Animal and Plant Inspection Act (revised 2003) and its supporting regulations Plant and Animal Quarantine Regulations (2000). There are a number of other items relevant to the VS including particularly the Food Safety Act and a Disaster Risk Management Act. A wide-ranging Biosecurity bill is in final draft and is expected to be enacted in 2026. Other acts cover meat exports (outdated) and endangered species. MoHHS covers the import of human medicines but does not cover veterinary medicines or products.

Animal and Plant Inspection Act

The current legislation focuses on quarantine and the prevention of entry of animal and plant pests and diseases into RMI and the response to any incursion. In the legislation the Chief of Agriculture is responsible for administration and enforcement, however this role has now been assigned to the Chief of Quarantine.

The Act states that emergency measures may be made at any time by an agricultural quarantine inspector or the Chief of Agriculture (now Chief of Quarantine) to respond to a ‘situation not covered by the controls, quarantines or regulations…’ as issued by the Act.

The emergency quarantine measures must be reviewed by the Chief of Agriculture (now Chief of Quarantine) and either incorporated into existing regulations or rescinded as soon as practicable after issuance, and not later than thirty days after the measure is taken.

All imported animals and animal products are to be inspected by agricultural quarantine inspectors and may be refused entry into or movement within the country if they are known to be, or are suspected of being, infected or infested with pests. Provision is made that all aircraft and ships must be inspected by agricultural quarantine inspectors for the purpose of enforcing the controls, quarantines and regulations as per this Act, but US military aircraft and vessels are subjected only to military security regulations. To support inspection, cargo manifests and other documents are to be made available to the agricultural quarantine inspectors.

Products seized by an agricultural quarantine inspector can be destroyed by fire or other appropriate means, or expelled from the country, or returned to its place of origin, at the owner's expense.

The regulations cover in greater detail the appointment of inspectors, designated ports of entry, specific conditions of entry, examination for export, in transit goods, disposal of garbage, sampling, seizure and destruction.

The regulations provide for an emergency response for the control or eradication of pests or diseases and allow for the designation of a 'quarantine area' and the carrying out of control measures (unspecified). Reference is made to OIE List A and List B diseases [2]and any other communicable disease of socio-economic or public health importance.

Penalties are stated in the act with violations liable for USD 1,000 fine or one year in gaol.

Disaster Risk Management Act

Under the Disaster Risk Management Act, mechanisms are in place for the declaration of an emergency and the release of funds to respond to the emergency.

The Disaster Risk Management Act (2023) defines the 'Disaster Management Structure' which is led by a 'National Disaster Council' of senior government officials that set strategic directions, provide oversight of progress and challenges and liaise with the cabinet. A National Emergency Operations Committee is responsible for disaster preparedness and disaster response operations in accordance with the National Emergency Response Plan. The National Disaster Management Office (NDMO) is required to facilitate government agencies, local governments, private sector entities, community groups and individuals to identify, implement and participate in disaster risk management which includes the preparation of the National Disaster Plans.

Each agency is required to develop disaster response and disaster resilience plans – MNRC has not yet completed this task. The disaster resilience plan is to include the financial arrangements to support all aspects of the plan. Local governments must also develop disaster response and disaster resilience plans.

There is no reference to animal health emergencies in the Disaster Risk Management Act. A 'health disaster' is defined as 'an event caused by a health incident requiring a disaster response … and includes but is not limited to vector disease outbreaks, virus threats or outbreaks, or epidemic or pandemic threats or outbreaks'.

A formal process for declaring an emergency has been established and this allows the release of funds. A special revenue account, a 'Disaster Assistance Account' is established within the National Treasury and under the control of the Ministry of Finance, in accordance with the Public Financial Management Act (2023).

[2] Note that the terms List A and List B diseases are no longer used by WOAH (previously OIE)

Food Safety Act

The Food Safety Act (2010) covers registration of premises, training of food handlers, inspection and powers of entry, product sampling, confiscation and destruction, and sets out penalties. The act does not cover the authorisation of imports or the safety of imported food. Though the farm to fork approach is advocated there is only limited reference to the production, slaughter and handling of animal sourced foods. It is stated that the 'Safety of food for human consumption depends on good hygienic practices in… the primary production, slaughter, and butchering of animals' but with no further reference to the need for ante- and post-mortem inspection or meat inspection. To protect human health MNRC is required to establish such regulations and standards for food safety from farm-to-table.

Biosecurity Bill

The Biosecurity Act is expected to become law in 2026. This act will cover the broad remit of national biosecurity including border control and quarantine, import and export requirements, response to pests and diseases with emergency powers of surveillance, entry and control, power of a director and officers and penalties. A Biosecurity Emergency Response Plan is to be in place to guide surveillance and control measures. The Biosecurity Act will permit the Minister to declare notifiable pests and diseases, which must then be published in the Gazette, and will require a 'person who knows of or suspects the occurrence of a notifiable pest or disease in the Marshall Islands [to] as soon as reasonably practicable notify the Director; a person failing to comply will commit an offense.

IV-1.A.b. Strengths:

- Animal and Plant Inspection Act and its supporting regulations, Plant and Animal Quarantine Regulations, in place
- Food Safety Act makes reference to animal sourced foods
- Disaster Risk Management Act sets out legislation for responding to emergencies
- Biosecurity bill in the final stages of drafting

IV-1.A.c. Weaknesses:

- The Animal and Plant Inspection Act is currently outdated and needs revision, with reference to international standards – the Biosecurity bill will partially address this
- The Food Safety and Disaster Risk Management Acts make little reference to animal and veterinary public health
- Current legislation has major gaps including powers of entry/seizure, licensing/registration of veterinary medicines, their distribution and use, premises and animal registration and identification, animal welfare, registration/accreditation of veterinarians and paravets – the Biosecurity bill does not address many of these gaps
- Regulations and plans, such as the Biosecurity Emergency Response Plan, are not available to provide detailed direction and powers to act

IV-1.A.d. Recommendations:

- Update VS legislation with reference to international standards considering partnerships and support from regional and international agencies (PH, WOAH, FAO)
- Revise/extend the Food Safety and Disaster Risk Management Acts to cover animal and veterinary public health
- Develop implementing regulations to provide detailed direction and powers to act

IV-1.A.e. Evidence (as listed in Appendix 5): L1, L2, L3, L4, L5, L6

IV-1. VETERINARY LEGISLATION

DEFINITION
The effectiveness of *veterinary legislation* (including laws and regulations).
B. Implementation and compliance
The authority and capability of the VS to ensure implementation of and compliance with *veterinary legislation* across the veterinary domain through communication, compliance and inspection activities. This competency includes formal collaboration with other relevant ministries and *Competent Authorities*, national agencies and decentralised institutions that share responsibility for implementation or have mutual interest in relevant areas.
LEVELS OF ADVANCEMENT - 2
1. *Veterinary legislation* is not implemented or poorly implemented, and it is not supported by communication, compliance and inspection activities.
2. *Veterinary legislation* is implemented through some activities of communication and awareness raising on stakeholder legal obligations, but few compliance and inspection activities are conducted.
3. *Veterinary legislation* is implemented through a programme of communication and awareness raising, and through formal, documented compliance and inspection activities. The VS undertake some legal action (e.g. administrative fines or prosecution) in instances of non-compliance in most relevant fields of activity.
4. *Veterinary legislation* is implemented across the entire veterinary domain and is consistently applied. The VS work to minimise instances of non-compliance through multiple means, including through targeted communications, incentives and appropriate legal processes. They have documented reports of responding to non-compliance.
5. *Veterinary legislation* compliance programmes are regularly subjected to audit and review by the VS or external agencies.

IV-1.B.a. Findings:

Agricultural quarantine inspectors are appointed, under the Animal and Plant Inspection Act, by the Public Service Commission, and are directed by the Chief of Agriculture, now transferred by letter to the Chief of Quarantine, to enforce the provisions of the Act.

Quarantine officers check the declarations of incoming passengers and will randomly open some luggage. If undeclared products are found the officers require adjustment of the declaration form – there is no confiscation and no penalties are imposed. (The scanner at Majuro airport is not working). Similarly, yachts must report at Majuro or Ebeye and may be checked for animal products. The manifests of commercial shipping containers are assessed, and officers will be present at the opening of containers containing food items, usually after delivery direct to the supermarkets – examination is only at opening not after unloading.

There are limited awareness signs of the need for declaration and the risks to biosecurity at Majuro airport

No other enforcement activities are undertaken.

IV-1.B.b. Strengths:

- Quarantine officers operating at sea and airports, and at opening of shipping containers

IV-1.B.c. Weaknesses:

- Few signs on protecting biosecurity at the airport
- No confiscation of product or penalties are imposed by quarantine officers
- Signs and banners requiring declarations of food products at the airport are very limited

IV-1.B.d. Recommendations:

- Implement policy of confiscating animal and food products of risk at sea and airports
- Impose penalties for major infringements
- Update signs and banners requiring declarations of food products at the sea and airports

IV-1.B.e. Evidence (as listed in Appendix 5): L1, L2, L3, L4, L5, L6

IV-2. INTERNATIONAL HARMONISATION

DEFINITION
The authority and capability of the VS to be active in the harmonisation of national *veterinary legislation* and *sanitary measures* to ensure they take into account international standards, and/or related regional directives or guidelines.
LEVELS OF ADVANCEMENT – 2
1. National *veterinary legislation* and *sanitary measures* under the mandate of the VS do not take into account international standards.
2. The VS are aware of gaps, inconsistencies or non-conformities in national *veterinary legislation* and *sanitary measures* as compared to international standards, but do not have the capability or authority to rectify the problems.
3. The VS monitor the establishment of new and revised international standards and periodically review national *veterinary legislation* and *sanitary measures* in response.
4. The VS harmonise *veterinary legislation* and *sanitary measures* and can demonstrate a level of alignment with changing international standards. The VS also review and comment on the draft standards of relevant intergovernmental organisations, and work through regional organisations, where available, to ensure better harmonisation with international standards.
5. The VS actively and regularly participate at the international level in the formulation, negotiation and adoption of international standards[25], and use the standards to regularly harmonise national *veterinary legislation* and *sanitary measures*.

IV-2.a. Findings:

The veterinary legislation and sanitary measures under the mandate of the VS are dated and do not account for current international standards. The Animal and Plant Quarantine Act (updated 2003) and the Plant and Animal Quarantine Regulations (2000), require updating of content and extension to cover additional sectors and activities. The draft Biosecurity Bill when passed will update elements of the required veterinary legislation.

SPREP (the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme) has been supporting legislation in the Pacific region, particularly in the context of environmental protection and sustainable development including promoting biodiversity and the prevention of pest incursions. SPREP provides model laws or guidelines for countries to adapt to suit their national contexts. SPREP has supported the review of RMI's environmental laws and regulations. This work has supported alignment with multilateral environmental agreements such as the Paris Agreement or the Convention on Biological Diversity.

IV-2.b. Strengths:

- Basic VS legislation is in place
- Biosecurity Bill is in final draft
- SPREP has supported strengthening of environmental laws including on the management of pests and invasive species

IV-2.c. Weaknesses:

- Existing legislation is limited in coverage and is outdated
- The Biosecurity Bill strengthens the available legislation but lacks many important areas, as indicated in the WOAH Terrestrial Animal Health Code
- Develop regulations to provide details on implementing the legislation

- No legal expertise in the MRNC and no government veterinary expertise in RMI

IV-2.d. Recommendations:

- Enact the Biosecurity Bill as soon as possible
- Advocate for the need to update the VS and associated legislation
- Develop/recruit/contract the legal and veterinary expertise in the MRNC

IV-2.e. Evidence (as listed in Appendix 5): L1

IV-3. INTERNATIONAL CERTIFICATION

DEFINITION
The authority and capability of the VS to reliably certify *animals* and animal products, and related services and processes under their mandate, for export, in accordance with national *veterinary legislation*, international standards and importing country requirements. This refers to the country's veterinary export certification processes. Issues such as: the legislative basis, format and content of veterinary certificates; who signs certificates and the confidence they have in what they are certifying; and the outcome in terms of meeting international standards and/or importing country requirements to facilitate exportation should all be considered.
LEVELS OF ADVANCEMENT – 3
1. The VS have neither the authority nor the capability to certify *animals* and animal products for export.
2. The VS have the authority to certify certain *animals* and animal products for export, but are not always in compliance with national *veterinary legislation*, and international standards.
3. The VS develop and carry out certification for certain *animals*, animal products, services and processes for export under their mandate in compliance with international standards.
4. The VS develop and carry out all relevant certification programmes for all *animals*, animal products, services and processes for export under their mandate in compliance with international standards.
5. *The* VS carry out audits of their certification programmes, in order to maintain national and international confidence in their system.

IV-3.a. Findings:

The Quarantine Division has responsibility for health certification of animals for export. The only export of animals or animal products is of companion animals.

Export permits are only provided for the dogs, cats and birds to be exported in compliance with the receiving country's requirements. The Quarantine Division certifies the identification of animals using descriptions and microchipping with corresponding health tests and results provided by international laboratories.

Each year up to 50 animals are certified for export, mostly to the US.

IV-3.b. Strengths:

- Certification of animal identity process in place
- Animals for export are accepted by the US and other countries

IV-3.c. Weaknesses:

- No health certification possible in RMI

IV-3.d. Recommendations:

- Develop capacity to conduct tests for animal export, in country

IV-3.e. Evidence (as listed in Appendix 5): L2

IV-4. EQUIVALENCE AND OTHER TYPES OF SANITARY AGREEMENTS

DEFINITION
The authority and capability of the VS to apply flexibility in negotiating, implementing and maintaining equivalence and other types of sanitary agreements with trading partners. As a reference, Article 4 of the WTO SPS Agreement states: Member Countries shall accept the sanitary or phytosanitary measures of other Member Countries as equivalent, even if these measures differ from their own or from those used by other Members trading in the same product, if the exporting Member Country objectively demonstrates to the importing Member Country that its measures achieve the importing Member Country's appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection. For this purpose, reasonable access shall be given, upon request, to the importing Member Country for inspection, testing and other relevant procedures.
LEVELS OF ADVANCEMENT - 1
1. The VS have neither the authority nor the capability to negotiate or approve equivalence or other types of sanitary agreements with other countries.
2. The VS have the authority to negotiate and approve equivalence and other types of sanitary agreements with trading partners, but no such agreements have been implemented.
3. The VS have implemented equivalence and other types of sanitary agreements with trading partners on selected *animals*, animal products and processes.
4. The VS actively pursue the development, implementation and maintenance of equivalence and other types of sanitary agreements with trading partners on matters relevant to *animals*, animal products and processes under their mandate. They publish their existing sanitary agreements in the public domain.
5. The VS actively work with stakeholders and take into account developments in international standards, in pursuing equivalence and other types of sanitary agreements with trading partners.

IV-4.a. Findings:

The VS have neither the authority nor the capability to negotiate or approve equivalence or other types of sanitary agreements with other countries.

IV-4.b. Strengths:

- No strengths identified

IV-4.c. Weaknesses:

- No established veterinary service
- No veterinary or technical capacity in RMI

IV-4.d. Recommendations:

- Establish veterinary services in the country with the technical capability to review and recommend equivalence and/or sanitary agreements with trading partners

IV-4.e. Evidence (as listed in Appendix 5):

IV-5. TRANSPARENCY

DEFINITION
The authority and capability of the VS to notify WOAH, WTO, trading partners and other relevant organisations of its disease status, regulations and *sanitary measures* and systems, in accordance with established procedures, as applicable to international trade.
LEVELS OF ADVANCEMENT - 1
1. The VS do not notify.
2. The VS occasionally notify.
3. The VS notify in compliance with the procedures established by these organisations.
4. The VS regularly and actively inform stakeholders of changes in disease status, regulations and *sanitary measures* and systems, as applicable to international trade.
5. The VS, in cooperation with their stakeholders, carry out reviews or audits of their notification procedures.

IV-5.a. Findings:

As there is no surveillance programme there is no information on the animal health status of RMI.

RMI does not notify any international organisation, or regional countries or organisations such as PC. The PC is assisting countries to report their animal health/disease status in compliance with WOAH notification requirements.

IV-5.b. Strengths:

- No strengths identified

IV-5.c. Weaknesses:

- No information to report as no surveillance programme

IV-5.d. Recommendations:

- As the livestock industries and the VS develop comply with international protocols for disease reporting including periodic, typically twice yearly, reporting of endemic diseases and real-time event-based reporting of disease incursions or changes in animal health status

IV-5.e. Evidence (as listed in Appendix 5):

IV-6. ZONING

DEFINITION
The authority and capability of the VS to establish and maintain disease free *zones*, as necessary and in accordance with the criteria established by WOAH (and by the WTO SPS Agreement where applicable). Where a country has no need for or interest in developing disease free zones and has not initiated such a process, this critical competency should be assessed as 'Non-Applicable' (N/A).
LEVELS OF ADVANCEMENT - NA
1. The VS do not have the authority or capability to initiate the establishment of disease free *zones*.
2. The VS have identified a geographical animal sub-population or sub-populations as candidates to target a specific health status suitable for zoning.
3. The VS are implementing *biosecurity* and *sanitary measures* with the intention of establishing a disease free *zone* for selected *animals* and animal products.
4. The VS have established at least one disease free *zone* of selected *animals* and animal products with collaboration from producers and other stakeholders in alignment with WOAH standards.
5. The VS can demonstrate the scientific basis for any disease free *zone* and have gained recognition by WOAH and/or trading partners that they meet the criteria established by WOAH (and by the WTO SPS Agreement where applicable).

IV-6.a. Findings:

The animal health services have no authority or capability to initiate the establishment of disease free zones.

RMI has no export trade in livestock or livestock products.

As a series of atolls across a large area, consideration should be given to developing a disease free zone approach to the control of any TAD incursion. Emergency preparedness and response to animal diseases is considered under CCII.5.

IV-6.b. Strengths:

- NA

IV-6.c. Weaknesses:

- NA

IV-6.d. Recommendations:

- Consider options for protecting uninfected atolls from any emergency animal disease incursions – see CCII.5

IV-6.e. Evidence (as listed in Appendix 5):

IV-7. COMPARTMENTALISATION

DEFINITION
The authority and capability of the VS to establish and maintain disease free compartments in accordance with the criteria established by WOAH. Where a country or its relevant animal industries have no need for or interest in developing disease free compartments and neither party has initiated or considered such a process or partnership, this critical competency should be assessed as 'Non-Applicable' (N/A)
LEVELS OF ADVANCEMENT - NA
1. The VS do not have the authority or capability to initiate the establishment of disease free *compartments*.
2. The VS can identify animal sub-populations as candidate establishments with a specific health status suitable for compartmentalisation, in partnership with interested stakeholders.
3. The VS, working in close partnership with interested stakeholders, ensure that planned *biosecurity* measures to be implemented will enable the establishment and maintenance of disease free *compartments* for selected *animal*s and animal products.
4. The VS collaborate with producers and other stakeholders to define responsibilities and undertake actions that enable the establishment and maintenance of disease free *compartments* for selected *animals* and animal products, including a national government certification and accreditation system.
5. The VS can demonstrate the scientific basis for disease free *compartments* and have gained recognition by other countries that they meet the criteria established by WOAH (and by the WTO SPS Agreement where applicable).

IV-7.a. Findings:

The animal health services have no authority or capability to initiate the establishment of disease-free compartments.

RMI has no export trade in livestock or livestock products.

The TTM development pig farm project has been established with good levels of biosecurity and could, in the future, be considered as a possible compartment to protect its disease-free status if a TAD such as ASF were to occur in the country. Emergency preparedness and response to animal diseases is considered under CCII.5.

IV-7.b. Strengths:

- NA

IV-7.c. Weaknesses:

- NA

IV-7.d. Recommendations:

- Consider options for protecting the TTM commercial pig farm using a 'compartmentalisation' approach in case a TAD of pigs is introduced to Majuro Atoll – see CCII.5

IV-7.e. Evidence (as listed in Appendix 5):

PART IV: APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Country information

Geography

The Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) is a sovereign Micronesian island country and an associated state of the United States of America (US). Covering a total land area of only 180 sq.km, the Marshall Islands consist of 29 low-lying coral atolls and five islands comprising more than 1,000 individual islands and islets, scattered over 1,900,000 sq.km area in the central Pacific Ocean. The distance between the capitol Majuro and furthest outlying atoll is approximately 1,100 kms. It has a population of approximately 53,000 with over two thirds located in the main centres of Majuro and Kwajalein. The country has a significant diaspora resident in the US.

The terrain is flat typical of atolls with few small, shallow lakes and ponds, particularly on the atolls with larger land masses. These bodies of water are often brackish and have limited ecological significance. The country's coral reefs play a crucial role in supporting marine life and providing natural barriers against oceanic swells and storms

The atolls and islands form two parallel chains referred to as the Ratak (Sunrise) chain and Ralik (Sunset) chain that are both oriented in a northwest-southeast direction. RMI lies northeast of Papua New Guinea, southeast of the Federated States of Micronesia, north of Nauru and northwest of Kiribati. Located in the southern part of Ratak chain is the large Majuro atoll with the national capital, Majuro City, the largest and most populous city of RMI. Kwajelein, also in the Ratak chain, is the second largest atoll with the second largest population on Ebeye and a US military base.

Location of the Marshall Islands (World Atlas)

RMI has a tropical climate with low rainfall and one to two typhoons per year. Rainfall is seasonal, December to March being the drier months, and May to August the wetter months. Rainfall in any one atoll varies greatly from year to year with the northern atollsme receiving markedly less rainfall than the more southerly atolls. Due to the porosity of the soil, the rainwater soon disappears from the soil surface.

Climate change is an immediate threat with severe coastal erosion, droughts and saltwater intrusion. The country has poor soil quality and limited freshwater resources and is dependent on food imports for food security. Much of the imported food is highly processed and this has contributed to public health issues such as diabetes and obesity.

The Marshall Islands were sites of extensive US nuclear testing in the 1940s and 1950s and this has had extreme effects on the islands with some islands being depopulated and others having high rates of radioactivity and consequent health problems. The residual radiation continues to pose a risk to human and ecological health, restricting the repopulation and normal agricultural use of these atolls.

Map of the Marshall Islands (World Atlas)

Governance

The Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) is a parliamentary republic in free association with the United States of America – free movement is allowed into the Unites States of America. RMI operates under a parliamentary democratic system with its President, elected by the Nitijela (Parliament) from among its members, serving as both the head of state and government. The President appoints Cabinet Ministers from the Nitijela, each overseeing specific ministries and agencies. The structure of government, ministries and special agencies is shown below.

Governance is provided by the 1) Executive Branch with the President and cabinet, 2) the Legislative Branch of Parliament (Nitijela) and the Council of traditional chiefs (Iroji), and 3) the judicial branch made up of a Supreme Court, High Courts, Traditional Rights Court and District and Community Courts.



Organisation chart of the Government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands

The Nitijela, the unicameral parliament of RMI comprises 33 members. These members are elected from 24 electoral districts, which correspond to the inhabited islands and atolls. The distribution includes 19 single-seat constituencies and 5 multi-seat constituencies. The 24 districts are: Ailinglaplap, Ailuk, Arno, Aur, Ebon, Enewetak, Jabat, Jaluit, Kii, Kwajalein, Lae, Lib, Likiep, Majuro, Maloelap, Mejit, Mili, Namdrik, Namu, Rongelap, Ujae, Utirik, Wotho and Wotje.

The role of local government is significant, especially given the country's decentralized and culturally rooted governance structure. The key roles of local government include management of local affairs and development, maintenance of peace and order, provision of basic health services, education and maintenance of infrastructure. Local governments may pass bylaws and must manage local budgets. They are expected to work closely with traditional leaders (Iroij).

Population

RMI has a population of approximately 42,000 people (census 2021), concentrated primarily in the urban centers of Majuro (the capital) and Ebeye Island in the Kwajalein Atoll. These two locations account for over 70% of the country's population, resulting in high population densities and urban pressures. In contrast, the outer atolls are sparsely populated, with some hosting fewer than 100 people. Internal migration toward urban centers, driven by access to education, healthcare, and employment opportunities, has led to declining populations in remote areas. Additionally, a significant number of Marshallese—estimated at over 40,000—live abroad, primarily in the U.S., under the terms of the Compact of Free Association (COFA). The population is youthful, with a high birth rate, although recent years have seen slower growth due to migration and shifting socio-economic conditions. The table below lists the population of the inhabited atolls and islands (2021 Census)

Atoll/Island	Population	Land Area	Chain
Majuro (Capital)	23,156	9.7	Ratak
Kwajalein	9,789	16.4	Ralik
Ailinglaplap	1,175	14.7	Ralik
Jaluit	1,409	10.9	Ralik
Arno	1,141	12.9	Ratak
Mili	497	15.9	Ratak
Namu	525	6.1	Ralik
Maloelap	395	9.8	Ratak
Aur	317	5.6	Ratak
Namorik	299	2.8	Ralik
Ujae	310	1.5	Ralik
Utirik	264	2.3	Ratak
Lae	133	1.5	Ralik
Likiep	288	10.2	Ratak
Ailuk	235	5.4	Ratak
Mejit	230	2.0	Ratak
Lib	156	0.9	Ralik
Ebon	469	5.8	Ralik
Wotje	816	8.2	Ratak
Enewetak/Ujelang	296	5.8	Ralik
Kili/Bikini/Ejit	415	0.93	Ralik

Jabat	75	0.6	Ralik
Wotho	88	4.3	Ralik

Source: 2021 Census Report. Note: The 'Chain' column indicates whether the atoll/island is part of the Ratak (Sunrise) or Ralik (Sunset) chain.

Economy

The RMI economy is small, open, and heavily reliant on external assistance—particularly from the United States through the Compact of Free Association (COFA). Under this agreement, the U.S. provides significant financial aid, access to federal programmes, and defence support. A major recent development is the negotiation of the renewed COFA funding package, set to provide over USD 2.3 billion to the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau over the next 20 years, which is seen as critical for sustaining public services and development initiatives. The latest COFA was signed in October 2023.

The country's economy faces major challenges, including geographic isolation, limited natural resources, a narrow export base (primarily fish and copra), and vulnerability to climate change and natural disasters. Rising sea levels and coastal erosion are particularly threatening, driving national efforts to secure climate adaptation funding and international support.

National GDP has increased steadily over the past decade from USD 180 million in 2016 to USD 290 million in 2023. GDP per capita increased from USD 5,546 in 2020 to USD 6,763 in 2023. Notwithstanding improvements in GDP and GDP per capita it is estimated that some 50% of Marshallese are now living in the U.S.

Agriculture is mostly subsistence-based, with limited commercial activity. The primary crops are breadfruit, pandanus, coconut, taro, and banana. Copra production (dried coconut flesh for oil) is the most significant cash crop and an important export product, though its economic role has declined recently. Home gardening and small-scale farming are common. Livestock is limited to one commercial pig farm (95 sows) run by the TTM development project, smaller pig production units in Laura (part of Majuro atoll) and small numbers of pigs and chickens in households on most of the inhabited islands.

RMI exports no livestock or animal products but imports almost all its meat and animal products. Small numbers of companion animals, mostly dogs and cats, enter or leave the country each year with most coming from or going to the U.S. The estimated annual imports of meat and other animal products for the period June 2024 – May 2025:

Product	Metric tonnes
Beef	105
Pork	80
Mutton	7
Poultry	467
Table eggs	154
Dairy	165

No livestock census has been conducted and estimates of animal numbers are not available. There is one commercial pig farm operated in partnership between MNRC and TTM and a few smallholder pig producers in the Laura Farmers Association. Backyard pigs and poultry are common. There are large numbers of dogs and some cats. There is no beekeeping in RMI.

Appendix 2: Timetable of the mission

Sites/ facilities visited & people met

Note: Randon Jack and Jenki Tibon (David) accompanied the team on almost visits and to most meetings.

Date	Activity	Name(s)	Position	Organisation/ Institution	Location
21/3/2025	Opening Meeting	Randon Jack	Chief - Forestry	MNRC	MNRC
		Jenki Tibon (David)	Chief - Agriculture	MNRC	MNRC
		Silver Wase	Chief - Quarantine	MNRC	MNRC
		Iva Reimers-Roberto	Secretary	MNRC	MNRC
		Joel Bujen	Agroforestry Officer	MNRC	MNRC
		Byrelson Jacklick	Invasive Species Coordinator	MNRC	MNRC
22/3/2025	Farm visits	Henrichel Riklon	Farmer	Laura Farmer Association	Laura
		Anja Hiram	Farmer	Laura Farmer Association	Laura
		Fosto Hiram	Farmer	Laura Farmer Association	Laura
		Resta Kattil	Farmer	Laura Farmer Association	Laura
		Tony Muller	Minister	MNRC	Laura
		10 farmers	Members of Laura Farm Association	Laura Farmer Association	Laura
24/3/2025	Meetings with MNRC	Tony Muller	Minister	MNRC	Laura
		Randon Jack	Chief - Forestry	MNRC	MNRC
		Jenki Tibon (David)	Chief - Agriculture	MNRC	MNRC
		Silver Wase	Chief - Quarantine	MNRC	MNRC
		Byrelson Jacklick	Invasive Species Coordinator	MNRC	MNRC
		Juda Abner	Livestock Opfficer	MNRC	TTM
	Meetings with TTM	Rubon Sofa	Livestock Opfficer	MNRC	TTM
		Jatin Hekena	Livestock Opfficer	MNRC	TTM
		Steve Nelson	Livestock Opfficer	MNRC	TTM
		Yu Ming Lu	Project Leader	TTM	TTM
		Willy Chung	Veterinarian	TTM	TTM
26/3/2025	Meetings with MNRC	Brenda Lulu Kablia Lejjena	Chief - Finance and Administration	MNRC	MNRC
	Meeting with Customs	Doug Anjain	Acting Chief Customs	Customs	MNRC

	Meetings with EPA	Aaron Langinlia	Chief - Solid Waste	EPA	EPA
		Francis Kanabura	Interen	EPA	EPA
	Meeting with NDMO	Isidore	Director	NDMO	NDMO
	Meeting with MoHHS	Linda Chutaro	EH Director	MoHHS	MoHHS
		Dustin Bantol	Deputy Secretary	MoHHS	MoHHS
		Jane Matianaicake	Senior Epidemiologist	MoHHS	MoHHS
		Edlen Anzues	Acting Deputy Secretary	MoHHS	MoHHS
		Frank Underwood	Pblic Health Director	MoHHS	MoHHS
26/3/2025	Visit to airport	Silver Wase	Chief - Quarantine	MNRC	MNRC
	Visits seaports x 2	Silver Wase	Chief - Quarantine	MNRC	MNRC
	Meetings at MNRC	Walter Myazoe	Deputy Secretary	MNRC	MNRC
		Brenda Lulu Kabua Lejjena	Chief - Finance and Administration	MNRC	MNRC
		Daniel Kramer	Board Member	RMI Love Animals	MNRC
27/3/2025		Berlin Pilippo	Secretary	RMI Love Animals	MNRC
	Meetings with MNRC	Silver Wase	Chief - Quarantine	MNRC	MNRC
		Randon Jack	Chief - Forestry	MNRC	MNRC
		Jenki Tibon (David)	Chief - Agriculture	MNRC	MNRC
		Walter Myazoe	Deputy Secretary	MNRC	MNRC
28/3/2025		Brenda Lulu Kabua Lejjena	Chief - Finance and Administration	MNRC	MNRC
	Closing meeting	Randon Jack	Chief - Forestry	MNRC	MNRC
		Jenki Tibun (David)	Chief - Agriculture	MNRC	MNRC
		Silver Wase	Chief - Quarantine	MNRC	MNRC
		Marissa Note	National Technical Manager, Small Islands Food and Water Project	MNRC	MNRC
		Paulphen Clanry	Asst Chief of Agriculture	MNRC	MNRC
		Byrelson Jacklick	Invasive Species Coordinator	MNRC	MNRC
		Aaron Langinlia	Chief - Solid Waste	EPA	MNRC

	Ela Borja	Support Consultant Pacific Sub-region	WOAH	online
	Maho Urabe	Regional Capcity Building Cooridnator	WOAH	online
29/3/2025	Elenoa Salele	SPC PHOVAPS Coordinator	SPC	online
	Candice Odelia	Volunteer	RMI Love Animals	home

Appendix 3: Air travel itinerary

Name	Date	From	To	Flight No.	Departure	Arrival
John Weaver	20/3/2025	Melbourne	Brisbane	QF628	17.25	18.40
	20/3/2025	Brisbane	Majuro	HI6205	22.15	09.20 (+1)
	29/3/2025	Majuro	Brisbane	HI6206	16.05	23.10
	30/3/2025	Brisbane	Melbourne	QF1265	11.15	14.45
Ian Peebles	20/3/2025	Canberra	Brisbane	QF1908	18:45	19:25
	20/3/2025	Brisbane	Majuro	HI6205	22.15	09.20 (+1)
	29/3/2025	Majuro	Brisbane	HI6206	16.05	23.10
	30/3/2025	Brisbane	Sydney	QF505	06:10	08:45
	30/3/2025	Sydney	Canberra	QF1433	09:15	10:25

Appendix 4: Public-Private Partnerships

RMI has very limited animal production with only one commercial pig producer (95 sows) and no commercial poultry producers. There are no ruminants in RMI. There are large numbers of owned and partially owned, largely free-roaming dogs. There are two public private partnerships in the country. MNRC advised it is also interested in reestablishing commercial poultry production if appropriate partnership arrangements can be made.

Pig production

MNRC and TTM work in partnership to support the commercial production of pigs from the TTM farm in Laura. Government provides the opportunity, regulations and bylaws, staffing (paravets who are paid by TTM) as required in the development of the commercial pig farm. Extension activities are now being undertaken by TTM with MNRC support with smallholder pig producers of the Laura Farmers Association. Currently ten producers have been enlisted with more to be added. TTM provides breeding stock, husbandry oversight and health advice – no treatments are given. A pig slaughterhouse, the first in the country, is to be built by TTM and government in partnership and should be operational by late 2025. This public-private partnership is supporting RMI's policy drive for improved food security.

Dog control

The NGO, RMI Love Animals, delivers a dog welfare programme with veterinary missions visiting the country three or four times annually and undertaking sterilisation and vaccination of large numbers of dogs, and some cats. The missions operate from local community centres such as church halls and progress from one area of Majuro to another; there has also been one mission to Ebeye. The missions are supported by MNRC with some logistics support (vehicles etc), funding from some donor projects (Canada, U.S.), self-funding drives, and staffing by volunteer U.S. veterinarians and animal technicians, and also staff support from MNRC and other local Marshallese. The programme is resulting in reduced but healthier numbers of dogs.

Appendix 5: List of documents used in the PVS evaluation

Key		
L	Legislation	
D	Documents	
P	Photos	
W	Websites	
Legislation		
L1	Animal and Plant Inspection Act 2003	I.1, I.6A, II,3, II.4A, II.5, II.6, II.12A&B, II.13, IV.1A&B, IV.3
L2	Plant and Animal Quarantine Regulations 2000	I.1, I.6A, II,3, II.4A, II.5, II.6,II.12A&B, II.13, IV.1A&B, IV.4
L3	Food Safety Act 2020	I.2B, I.6A&B, II.7A&B, III.4, IV.1A&B
L4	Disaster Risk Management Act 2023	I.6B, I.8, I.9, II.5, IV,1A&B
L5	Biosecurity bill	I.4, I.5, I.6A&B, I.8, II.3, II.4A, II.5, II.6, II.12A&B, II.13, III.2, III.6, IV.1A&B
L6	Constitution	IV.1A&B
Documents		
D1	Paravet training (SPC)	I.2B, I.3
D2	Homemade remedies (SPC)	I.2B, II.8
D3	Quarantine entry permit	II.3
D4	Export certificate	II.1A, IV.3
D5	Budget report (MNRC)	I.4, I.6A, I.7, I.8
D6	Travel log (MNRC)	I.8, III.3
D7	MNRC Operational plan	I.4, I.5, I.6A&B, I.7, I.8, II.3, II.4, II.6
D8	WHO country profile	I.6B, II.2, II.4A, II.6
D9	GHSI - RMI	I.2B. I.3, I.5, I.6B, I.9, II.2, II.4A, II.5, II.8, II.9
D10	NAP - AMR	I.4, I.5, I.6A&B, II.2, II.4A&B, II.8, II.9, II.10
D11	National Disaster Risk Management Arrangements	I.4, I.5, I.6A&B, I.9, II.5
D12	RMI - National Strategic plan	I.5
D13	RMI - Agricultural sector plan	I.4, I.5, I.7, I.8, I.9, II.2
D14	Transforming Marshall Islands Food Systems (UN)	I.5, II.2, II.7A&B
D15	Multi-country programming framework for the Pacific Islands (FAO)	I.5, II.2, II.7A&B
D16	National Invasive Species Action Plan	I.4, I.6A&B, I.8, I.9, II.6
D17	Job descriptions x 4	I.1B, I.6A, II.3, II.4A, II.5, II.6
D18	Vacancy notices x 5	I.1B, I.6A, II.3, II.4A, II.5, II.6

Photos		
P1	MNRC building	I.7
P2	MNRC meeting rooms and offices x 5	I.7
P3	MNRC vehicles	I.7
P4	ASF Ag tests	II.1A&B
P5	Laura Famer Association visits x 4	I.1A&B, I.2A&B, II.2, II.6, II.8, II.11, II.13, III.1, III.6, III.7
P6	TTM sign and farm visits x 6	I.1A&B, I.2A&B, II.2, II.6, II.8, II.11, II.13, III.1, III.6, III.7
P7	TTM drugs, including expired drugs	I.1A, I.2A, II.8, II.9
P8	TTM feeds and feedstuffs x 3	II.11
P9	TTM biosecurity sign	II.2, II.3
P10	NDMO and NEOC x 3	I.9, II.5
P11	Supermarket meat packaging and eggs x 4	II.7B, II.12B
P12	RMI Love Animals - drug store x 3	II.8, III.4, III.6, III.7
P13	ASF poster (USDA)	II.2, II.3, II.4A, II.5, II.6, III.1
P14	CRB posters and flyers x 3	II.2, II.3, II.4A, II.5, II.6, III.1
P15	Radio station (Rmi Love Animals)	III.1
P16	Shipping wharf	II.2
Websites		
W1	Visiting Veterinarians international: https://visitingveterinarians.com/projects	I.1A, III.7
W2	Marshall Islands Journal: https://marshallislandsjournal.com/multiple-veterinary-team-coming	I.1A, III.7
W3	SPC - New paravets training in the Marshall Islands to boost animal health and livestock development: https://www.spc.int/updates/blog/blog-post/2024/12/new-paravets-training-in-the-marshall-islands-to-boost-animal-health	I.1B, I.2B, I.3, II.4A, II.6, II.8, II.9, II.13
W4	Marshall Islands Organization for Animal Welfare (MIOAW): https://www.infomarshallislands.com/vet-clinics-majuro/	I.1A, II.13, III.7

Appendix 6: Organisation of the WOAH PVS Evaluation

Assessors Team	
Team leader:	John Weaver
Technical expert:	Ian Peebles
Expert trainee:	NA
Observer/Facilitator:	NA
Information of the mission	
Contact point in the country:	Randon Jack
Contact point in the country:	Jenki Tibon (David)
Dates:	21 – 29 March 2025
Language of report:	English
Language of the mission:	English
Subject of the evaluation	VS as defined in the Terrestrial Animal Health Code Not Inclusive of aquatic animals Inclusive of other institutions / ministries responsible for activities of VS Human health and environmental health agencies Disaster agency Private sector and development agencies
Analysis	
References and Guidelines:	○ Terrestrial Animal Health Code (especially Chapters 3.1. & 3.2.) ○ WOAH PVS Tool for the Evaluation of Performance of VS → Human, physical and financial resources → Technical authority and capability → Interaction with stakeholders → Access to markets
Activities analysed:	All activities related to animal and veterinary public health ○ Field activities: ▪ animal health (early detection, disease control, etc) ▪ quarantine (country border entry points) ▪ veterinary public health (food safety, veterinary drugs etc) ▪ others ○ Data and communication ○ Diagnostic laboratories ○ Initial and continuous training ○ Organisation and finance
Procedure:	○ Consultation of data and documents ○ Field trips ○ Interviews and meetings with VS staff and stakeholders ○ Analyse of practical processes

*** End of report***